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ABSTRACT
NOT JUST NOISE: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN COGNITIVE ABILITY AND
RESPONSE BIAS
FEBRUARY 2017
TINA CHEN, B.S., UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI COLUMBIA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Caren M. Rotello

Response bias is a component of decision making that can be defined as the general
willingness to respond a certain way. For example, in recognition memory, one can have
a response bias towards responding that a test item has been previously studied, or in
reasoning, one can have a response bias towards responding that a conclusion is logically
valid. However, not all individuals have the same response bias. Indeed, there is some
evidence that response bias is a stable cognitive trait in memory that differs across
individuals (Kantner & Lindsay, 2012, 2014). One predictor of this trait may be cognitive
ability, since it appears to predict response bias in memory (Zhu et al., 2010) and in
reasoning (e.g., Handley & Trippas, 2015). While memory and reasoning have similar
decision making components and may be very related (Heit & Hayes, 2011; Heit,
Rotello, & Hayes, 2012), this experiment is the first to test whether cognitive ability
predicts response bias in both tasks. Experiment 1 showed that higher cognitive ability
participants were more conservative than lower cognitive ability participants in
reasoning, but not in memory. Experiment 2 showed that participants did generally
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follow task demands to shift their bias some, but this shift was not predicted by cognitive
ability. This study shows that further research is needed to examine individual differences
in response bias as one way to account for what has previously been treated as noise.
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CHAPTER 1
RESPONSE BIAS
Introduction
Response bias, i.e., one’s general willingness to pick an option or make a
behavioral response over another, affects all kinds of decision making. For example,
when deciding if you should wave back at the person who is waving at you, there is some
influence of the strength of recognition for that person, but there is also a level of general
willingness to wave at people. Some people might wave even if they have only a little bit
of evidence that they know the person, perhaps because they weigh the cost of waving
lower than the benefit of seeming friendly. Another example of response bias in decision
making might be when deciding if your friend has made a sound, logical argument. There
is some degree of the strength of the argument, but there may also be a level of general
willingness to believe the friend has made a good argument; perhaps the friend is a smart
or reasonable person. Notably, this general willingness to make a particular behavioral
response is independent of any underlying evidence or strength for that response. Still,
response bias does affect the behavior.
Response bias is important in behavioral cognitive psychology because while the
processes are cognitive, the data of interest are behavioral: inferences about mental
processes are made based on the behavioral response, which is of course influenced by
response bias. Response bias has been thoroughly described in the context of recognition
memory (e.g., Macmillan & Creelman, 1990), so a discussion of it in those terms follows.
In the context of a recognition study, participants may have a general inclination to
respond that a test item was previously studied, i.e., "old," or that it was not previously
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studied, i.e., "new." Response bias in memory research is generally operationalized as
one's willingness to respond "old" to an item; a liberal response bias indicates a greater
willingness to respond "old" and a conservative response bias indicates a lesser
willingness to respond "old." This response bias is independent of the retrieval process or
the evaluation of the evidence of memory strength, i.e., the ability to discriminate
between old (target) and new (lure) items (Macmillan & Creelman, 1990). That is, both
discriminability and response bias influence the behavioral response of indicating an item
is “old,” but they are not the same process. A similar response bias occurs in reasoning
tasks as well; for example, participants may have a greater or lesser willingness to
respond that a conclusion of a logic syllogism is valid or invalid.
Response bias can be manipulated by the researcher. For example, a base rate
manipulation influences bias by altering the proportion of old (or valid) items on the test;
with a higher proportion of old items, one should have a more liberal response bias.
Alternatively, response bias can be affected by rewarding certain responses more heavily
than others in a payoff manipulation. While response bias is important in any cognitive
task that requires decision making or discrimination, like categorization or perception,
my focus will be on response bias particularly in memory and reasoning, and more
specifically, on recognition memory tasks and a syllogistic reasoning task.
The importance of examining individual differences in response bias
Response bias is a decision making factor that is often different from the behavior
of interest (one that reflects a certain cognitive process), but it can influence our
understanding of accuracy or discriminability, which is often the process of interest.
Because certain measures conflate bias and discriminability (see Rotello & Macmillan,
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2008), it is important to account for each construct in measurement.
Accurately measuring response bias with quantitative models. While multiple
models have been developed to separate these constructs (e.g., Pazzaglia, Dube, &
Rotello, 2013), there is ample evidence in support of signal detection models (e.g.,
Banks, 1970; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005), especially for the memory and reasoning
tasks used in the current study (e.g., Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2010; Pazzaglia et al., 2013).
Therefore, the most relevant model for this study is the signal detection model, and a
discussion of that model follows.
Response bias in the signal detection model. The simplest signal detection
model (see Figure 1A) posits that items in memory vary in strength along an axis of
strength of evidence or familiarity (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Items that were
studied in the list (targets, represented by the Normal distribution in the solid line) have
higher memory strength and are shifted to the right in comparison to items that were not
recently studied (lures, represented by the Normal distribution in the dotted line).
Because these two distributions have the same variance, this model is referred to as the
equal-variance signal detection model (EVSD). According to this model, participants
who are asked to respond if an item is old or new will place a decision criterion c
somewhere along the strength axis. So items are rated as “old” when the memory strength
for the item exceeds the decision criterion. In other words, only items that have high
enough memory strength will be identified as “old.” Criteria farther to the right in the
figure are more conservative: lesser willingness to respond “old” unless the evidence is
very strong. Conversely, criteria farther to the left are more liberal: greater willingness to
respond “old” even when the evidence is not very strong.
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If participants are asked to rate the confidence of their response on a 6-point scale
ranging from “very sure new” to “very sure old,” the same logic applies but includes
more criteria to account for the different responses in between. Items are given the “very
sure old” rating when the memory strength for that item exceeds that criterion, or as in
Figure 1A, falls to the right of the rightmost vertical line c5 when the criteria are
numbered in order from left to right. Items are given the next highest confidence “sure
old” rating when memory strength falls between c4 and c5, etc.
There is usually some overlap in the target and lure distributions such that
depending on the placement of the criteria, some lures may be falsely recognized as old
items. Correctly identifying a target as an old item is referred to as a “hit” and incorrectly
identifying a lure as an old item is referred to as a “false alarm”; incorrectly identifying a
target as new is a “miss” and correctly identifying a lure as new is a “correct rejection.” If
memory for the studied items is very good, the distributions are farther apart and the
measure of sensitivity, d’, i.e., the distance between the means of the distributions
measured in standard deviation units, is larger: greater discriminability between old and
new items. This discriminability is distinct from the decision criteria c1 through c5 which
could be placed at different memory strengths regardless of the distance between the
distributions.

A)

B)
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Figure 1. A) The equal-variance signal detection (EVSD) model with five decision
criteria, represented as vertical lines, placed. The target distribution is represented with
the solid line and the lure distribution is represented with the dotted line. B) The unequalvariance signal detection (UVSD) model also with five decision criteria placed. The
target distribution is represented with the solid line and the lure distribution is represented
with the dotted line.
While Figure 1 presents theoretical distributions, one way to depict the empirical
data is in the form of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves, by plotting the
ratings for targets against the ratings for lures. Figure 2 shows an ROC with a strong
condition (based on the theoretical EVSD model in Figure 1A) in solid points and a weak
condition in open points. Specifically, with a 6-point scale, the first (left-most) point for
the condition plots the rate of responding “very sure old” to targets (y-coordinate) against
the rate of responding “very sure old” to lures (x-coordinate). To map onto the theoretical
distribution in Figure 1A, this is the proportion of the target distribution to the right of the
rightmost criterion plotted against the proportion of the lure distribution to the right of
that same criterion. The second point plots the rate of responding “very sure old” and
“sure old” to targets against the rate of responding thusly to lures; i.e., it plots the
cumulative sum of the hit rates and false alarm rates. In Figure 1, this is the proportion of
the target and lure distributions to the right of the second rightmost criterion. Note that
this second point includes the data from the first point, so it cannot fall to the left or
below the previous one in Figure 2. But, if there were, for example, no “sure old”
responses to a lure, and therefore no additional false alarms to be included in this point,
the second point would fall immediately above the first point (by however many more
hits from “sure old” responses to targets would be included). The third point in this ROC,
marked with an x in Figure 2, indicates the cumulative sum of all of the “old” responses,
providing an indicator of a binary decision between “old”/”new”, i.e., the more standard
5

definition of a hit rate and false alarm rate. By plotting the rest of the cumulative rates, a
curve emerges; there are only 5 visible points because the 6th point, the cumulative rate of
using the whole scale, must fall on the upper right hand corner (1, 1). In an ROC, points
to the left indicate more conservative responses, or lower rates of responding “old” in this
case, and points to the right indicate more liberal response, or higher rates of responding
“old”.

Figure 2. Idealized receiver operating characteristic curves (ROCs) for strong (from the
EVSD model in Figure 1) and weak conditions using a 6-point confidence scale. The x
through the third point in the ROC indicates the typically discussed hit and false alarm
rate (“old” responses to old items and “old” responses to new items, regardless of
confidence).
Also depicted in the ROC is an indication of discriminability, d’, between targets
and lures. Curves that are closer to the top left corner indicate greater d’; curves that fall
along the major diagonal (bottom left to top right corners) indicate d’ of 0. In Figure 2,
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the strong condition is shifted towards the upper left corner in comparison to the weak
condition, reflecting greater discriminability in the strong condition. Indeed, d’ and the
criteria can be found by fitting the signal detection model to the empirical data, finding
the best curve and criteria that fit the data, with some restrictions. For one, the end points
of this curve are at (0, 0) and (1, 1), the respective cumulative sums, though they are not
explicitly plotted on the ROC. Another restriction of the curve is that the ROC is
symmetrical along the minor diagonal (top left to bottom right corners) because these
data assume that the target and lure distributions have the same variance.
Despite this, there is ample empirical evidence that the simple model presented in
Figure 1A is not descriptive of the data, and an unequal-variance signal detection
(UVSD) model, such as the one presented in Figure 1B, is more appropriate (e.g.,
Mickes, Wixted, & Wais, 2007; Ratcliff, Sheu, & Gronlund, 1992). This model is very
similar to the EVSD model except that the target distribution has more variability than
the lure distribution. The measures of d’ and c are no longer appropriate since those are
measured in terms of the common standard deviation unit of the target and lure
distributions, which no longer applies. Instead, the measures of da, and ca are the more
general forms of the sensitivity and response bias measures and do not assume that the
target and lure distributions have equal variance. The formula for da, is as follows:
2

1

2
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 = �1+𝑠𝑠2 � [𝑧𝑧(𝐻𝐻) − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝐹𝐹)]

(Eq. 1)

where s, the slope, is the ratio of the lure distribution standard deviation to target
distribution standard deviation, z(H) is the z-score transformation of the proportion of
“old” responses to old items (i.e., z-transformed hit rate) and z(F) is the z-score

transformation of the proportion of “old” responses to new items (i.e., z-transformed false
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alarm rate) (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). If s is 1, i.e., it is an equal variance case, the
formula is just z(H) - z(F), or the formula for d’. The formula for ca is as follows:

𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 = �

−√2𝑠𝑠
1

(1+𝑠𝑠2 )2 (1+𝑠𝑠)

� [𝑧𝑧(𝐻𝐻) + 𝑧𝑧(𝐹𝐹)]

( Eq. 2)

where the same variable definitions as above apply. If s is 1, i.e., it is an equal
variance case, the formula is just -1/2*[z(H) + z(F)], or the formula for c. With multiple
responses (as in a confidence ratings design), multiple ca could be calculated for the
different responses.
Relative and Absolute Response Bias Measures and Optimal Response Bias
It should be noted that c and ca measure relative response bias, i.e., the distance of
the observed criterion location to the halfway point between the two distributions (e.g.,
Jones, Moore, Shub, & Amitay, 2015). In the EVSD context, c = 0 is located d’/2
standard deviation units to the right of the mean of the lure distribution, that is, where the
distributions intersect. In this context, c = 0 is also the optimal criterion location in that it
minimizes error: at this location, false alarms and misses are minimized. Similarly, in the
UVSD context, ca = 0 is located da/2 standard deviation units (roughly, an average of the
standard deviations of each distribution) to the right of the mean of the lure distribution.
Note that this is not equal to the intersection of the distributions and also not where false
alarms and misses are minimized because that point is determined by the inequality of the
variances. The response bias measures c and ca are relative to the midpoint of the two
distributions; in the case of EVSD, that midpoint is also an optimal criterion location.
Another measure of response bias would be absolute response bias, i.e., the
location along the x-axis centered at the mean of the lure distribution (also the 0 point
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used for d’). Absolute response bias can be measured with λ, calculated by -z(F). Using
the z-transformed false alarm rate still assumes a continuous distribution (a Normal
distribution), whereas using just the false alarm rate does not (as a proportion, it assumes
a binomial distribution). Using the z-transformed false alarm rate also allows for easy
conversion to c when d’ is known: c is the difference between the observed criterion
location λ and the reference point d’/2. Note that larger positive λ values, shifted farther
to the right of the lure distribution, reflect a more conservative absolute response bias,
i.e., fewer false alarms.

Figure 3. Zero points for relative and absolute response bias measures plotted on the
strong (solid black line) and weak (solid gray line) target distributions and lure
distribution (dashed black line) seen in Figure 2.
It is important to consider how different discriminability affects interpretation of
these measures of response bias. Consider a situation where some targets have been
repeated several times at study (strong discriminability) and some targets have been
presented only once at study (weak discriminability) and assume an EVSD model for
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simplicity such as the one in Figure 3. In the strong condition, the target distribution is
farther from the lure distribution, and so the halfway point is also farther. So in this case,
c = 0 in the strong condition has shifted farther along the x-axis relative to where c = 0 is
in the weak condition (λ of 0.88 vs. 0.5). Even if the criterion location does not shift
along the x-axis across the two conditions, the value of c would still change because the
point of reference (where c = 0) has changed: c reflects the distance from the optimal
criterion location, but optimal has changed. However, λ is in relation to the lure
distribution, which is centered at 0 on the x-axis, and so the interpretation of λ does not
change with differences in discriminability: it still reflects the criterion location for that
particular false alarm rate. Yet, because it does not take into consideration the hit rate, λ
is an imperfect measure of response bias. Reasons to use relative vs. absolute response
bias depend on the construct of interest. If the interest is in how people change response
bias regardless of discriminability, then λ may be more appropriate. If the interest is in
how people change response bias while accounting for differences in discriminability or
how they change in relation to an ideal location such as c = 0, then relative response bias
may be more appropriate.
Indeed, different strategies might be used by the participant to determine where to
place decision criteria (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). For example, in the waving
example introduced earlier, perhaps a person wants to set an optimal decision rule that
minimizes her “wrong” decisions about waving: she wants to avoid waving to people she
does not know (reduce her false alarm rate) but also avoid failing to wave to people she
does know (reduce her miss rate). In the context of a recognition study, if a participant
wanted to minimize the overall error rate, the optimal decision criterion placement of the
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old/new boundary in the EVSD model would be where the heights of the distributions are
the same, i.e., the two distributions crossover. Indeed, another measure of response bias is
the likelihood ratio (β) which is the ratio of the height of the target distribution (the
likelihood for the target distribution) to the height of the lure distribution (the likelihood
for the lure distribution). Therefore, when the heights of those distributions are the same
and so the proportions of correct “old” and “new” responses are maximized, the
likelihood ratio is 1. This optimal likelihood ratio which maximizes accuracy is not
exactly at 1 in the UVSD case, depending on the specific variances, but it is generally
close to 1.
Some participants may see the costs and benefits of such responses differently.
One might think it is better to be seen as friendly and wave to others, even if you might
not know them. In the context of a recognition study, if a participant did not weigh
correct “old” and “new” responses equally and wanted to maximize a weighted
combination of the correct responses, the optimal decision criterion placement would be
different; in other words, what is the weighted benefit of a hit vs. a correct rejection? This
weighting could be internally motivated or externally motivated. If there were external
motivations, such as in a payoff manipulation where experimenters may choose to reward
hits heavily and penalize false alarms less heavily in order to shift criterion to a more
liberal one, the optimal decision criterion placement would depend on the amount of
reward/penalty in order to maximize the expected value (Macmillan & Creelman,
2005).The formula for the weighted likelihood ratio is as follows:
[𝑅𝑅(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)−𝑅𝑅(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)] 𝑝𝑝(𝑆𝑆1 )

LR(𝑥𝑥) = 𝛽𝛽 = �

[𝑅𝑅(ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)−𝑅𝑅(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚)]
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� 𝑝𝑝(𝑆𝑆

2)

( Eq. 3)

where p(S1) refers to the probability of presenting a lure and p(S2) is the
probability of presenting a target. Imagine a test with an equal proportion of targets and
lures, and for simplicity, the researcher does not penalize for incorrect responses. If
correct rejections are only rewarded with 1 cent and hits are rewarded with 10 cents, the
likelihood ratio would be 1/10 or 0.1. A likelihood ratio less than 1 corresponds to a more
liberal response bias; in this case, the decision criterion would be placed where the height
of the target distribution is only 1/10 the height of the lure distribution, or much farther to
the left on the strength axis. It is worth noting that if only the payoff is manipulated,
participants cannot simultaneously maximize expected reward and accuracy because the
decision rules are different in that situation (with a 10 cent reward for hits and a 1 cent
reward for correct rejections, participants can either maximize expected value with
likelihood ratio of 0.1 or maximize accuracy with likelihood ratio of 1 as mentioned
earlier, but they cannot maximize both). Indeed, there is evidence that given the tension
between those decision rules, participants will compromise between the two (e.g., Bohil
& Maddox, 2001).
It seems reasonable to believe that these strategies could depend on the individual,
and so it becomes very clear that merely looking at the proportion of correct "old"
responses alone does not reflect underlying discriminability. That is to say, the proportion
of “old” responses would be influenced by how liberal the response bias as well as the
degree of discriminability. Thus, looking at certain accuracy measures like the proportion
of “old” responses without accounting for response bias does not provide a precise or
correct understanding of memory (Rotello & Macmillan, 2008).
The problem with averaging across individuals. In addition to needing to account for
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response bias by using such measures as ca, it is important to account for the variability in
response bias across individuals. Historically, models of cognition generally have been fit
to aggregate data rather than to individual data, though increasingly, there is a call to
avoid doing so because analyzing the aggregate can potentially obscure the nature of the
processes of interest (e.g., Cohen, Sanborn, & Shiffrin, 2008). For example, Anderson
and Tweney (1997) examined the shape of the forgetting curve in memory. Prior research
aggregated across individuals and found they were best fit by a power function, which
characterizes the rate of forgetting as decelerating over time. In their analysis, Anderson
and Tweney found that individuals were best fit by an exponential function, which
characterizes the rate of forgetting as constant across time. They attributed the different
conclusion for the group data to artifacts from averaging across individuals; it is clear
how such an artifact can impact cognitive theory (in this case, the nature of forgetting).
More specifically to the topic at hand, it is important to also avoid analyzing the
aggregate in response bias. If bias is different across individuals, averaging across them
could obscure the nature of the processes of interest, such as how participants might shift
their bias in response to a manipulation.
Some researchers have explicitly modeled individual differences in memory
(Batchelder & Riefer, 1990; Malmberg, 2008) and individual differences in response bias
in memory (Klauer & Kellen, 2010; Riefer, Hu, & Batchelder, 1994) and found that
participants do indeed differ. However, while these individual differences are
acknowledged to exist, the variance from individual differences is generally not of
interest to cognitive psychologists because the underlying mental processes are assumed
to be consistent across people, and most research is devoted to understanding these
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common processes.
In studies that do look at data at the individual level, the extra noise introduced by
these individual differences may reduce the study's power to detect common, underlying
processes of response bias. For example, Riefer and colleagues (1994) posited that the
previous interpretation of source monitoring experiments could be confounded with
response bias interpretations. While previous research had found that items generated by
the participant are better remembered than those generated by another person, it could be
the case that participants have a bias towards saying the other person generated the item
rather than more accurate memory for items generated by themselves. On the aggregate
level, Riefer et al. found that response bias differences across conditions could explain
the findings of their first experiment. On an individual level, participants also differed in
their response biases: participants with worse memory also had a greater response bias
towards saying the other person generated the item. These kinds of individual differences
in response bias, if considered to be noise, could reduce the power to detect overall
response biases across the different conditions. While this example was a source memory
recall study rather than a simple recognition memory study, and while Riefer et al. used a
different measure of response bias than the ones described here, the fact remains that
understanding individual differences can bolster our conceptualization, theories, and
future research to fully capture the phenomena of interest, such as memory and
reasoning.
Implications for experimental manipulations of bias. Not only is understanding
individual differences in response bias important for theorizing about the constructs of
memory and reasoning, but it is also important to improve our understanding of how

14

individual differences in response bias may affect interpretation of our studies. Individual
differences in response bias can interact with response bias manipulations in
experimental designs. For example, Van Zandt (2000) varied bias in two ways: via the
base rate (the proportion of targets and lures at test) and via payoff manipulations
(monetary rewards and penalties for responding old vs. new). Participants rated their
confidence that the test items were old or new. The bias manipulations led to different
sensitivity as well as different ratios of standard deviations of the target and lure
distributions within individuals. Van Zandt used this evidence to argue that ratings of
confidence of items being old or new were not scaled directly from the memory evidence
of those items, as is assumed by many models of recognition memory (Macmillan &
Creelman, 1990; Ratcliff et al., 1992). It’s possible that variability in criterion locations
led to these differences in sensitivity and standard deviation ratios (Rotello & Macmillan,
2008; Treisman & Faulkner, 1984; Treisman & Williams, 1984); individual differences
in response bias in using the confidence rating scale could have played a role.
Particularly, individuals may vary in how they use the ratings scale and those differences
may obscure the actual scaling from evidence to behavior. Indeed, Van Zandt (2000)
noted that the effect of bias manipulations on slopes and intercepts varied across
individuals: some individuals had large variability across the bias manipulations but some
did not.
In sum, individual differences in response bias have not been thoroughly studied,
in part because the process of response bias underlying cognition regardless of individual
difference has been the primary focus. But even examining individual level data,
commonly used measures of discriminability such as proportion correct are not
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independent of response bias. In this case then, not only are our conclusions about
accuracy flawed, but individual differences in response bias would also influence these
measures of accuracy, adding even more noise to the conclusions. It is important to use
measures of discriminability and response bias that are independent and to ensure greater
power from reducing noise by accounting for response bias differences. For example,
averaging across confidence levels may obscure how participants may use confidence
levels differently, which adds to the error term in statistical models; if we can predict or
capture those differences in scale usage, we can reduce the unexplained variance.
Additionally, participants may respond to bias manipulations in different ways, which
reduces the power of those manipulations; if we can predict or capture those differences
in response to bias manipulations, we can understand how effective those manipulations
are.
Extant research on individual differences in response bias
Some research has been done on response bias in memory in special populations,
generally finding more liberal response bias in: older adults in comparison to younger
adults (Del Missier et al., 2013; Gilinsky & Judd, 1994; Huh, Kramer, Gazzaley, & Delis,
2006), older adults with dementia in comparison to age-matched controls (Woodard,
Axelrod, Mordecai, & Shannon, 2004), older adults with Alzheimer’s disease specifically
in comparison to older adults with Huntington’s disease (Brandt, Corwin, & Krafft,
1992), patients with schizophrenia in comparison to a control group (Brébion, Smith,
Amador, Malaspina, & Gorman, 1998), and sub-clinical populations like people from a
typical undergraduate student sample who were identified as highly anxious (Dowens &
Calvo, 2003; Frenkel, Lamy, Algom, & Bar-Haim, 2009).
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Despite these consistent findings that certain special populations have more
liberal response bias, the study of individual differences in response bias within nonspecial populations has been inconsistent and sparse, perhaps due to a general disinterest
in exploring what is considered to be a nuisance variable. Nonetheless, because of the
potential issues that arise from individual differences, such as with interpretation of
model parameters and bias manipulations, it is essential to understand what the extant
literature says about individual differences in response bias in non-clinical populations
for memory tasks and reasoning tasks.
Individual differences in response bias in memory
False memory. Almost all of the studies conducted thus far on individual differences in
response bias in memory in non-clinical or special populations look at false memory
rather than veridical memory. For example, in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM)
paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995), participants study lists of
semantically related items. For example, participants may study a list that includes the
words "nurse," "sick," "clinic," "health," "patient," and "medicine." After the study list,
participants often remember the semantically related word "doctor" as having been
presented in the list even though it did not appear (Roediger & McDermott, 1995).
Participants, then, have false memory for the "critical lure," or the word that is likely to
be falsely remembered based on the experimenter-constructed list. In another false
memory paradigm, the misinformation paradigm (Loftus, 1975), participants are
presented information about an event, such as a car accident. After this, they may be
asked questions that include some false information about the event, such as, “How fast
was the car going when it ran the stop sign?” (p. 563) even though there was no stop sign
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in the original event. When tested later, participants remember that a stop sign did appear
in the original event (Loftus, 1975). Participants, then, have false memory for the
misinformation.
While studies of false memory may not explicitly address response bias, it is
reasonable to believe that there may be a connection between false memory and response
bias. Indeed, liberal response bias on a standard recognition task weakly predicts
increased false recall in DRM (Kantner & Lindsay, 2012) and liberal response bias was
correlated with false cued-recall (Jonker, 2016). Given the relationship between liberal
response criterion and false memory, understanding what individual differences predict
false memory may provide direction for what individual differences predict liberal
response bias.
The most promising of these is related to cognitive ability, defined here very
broadly as the capacity and ability to store, process, and manipulate information either as
in working memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 1996), executive functioning
(Baddeley, 1996; Miyake et al., 2000) or intelligence (Cattell, 1994; Engle & Tuholski,
1999). While even the constructs within executive functioning alone (shifting, inhibition,
and maintenance) are separable and not necessarily correlated with each other (Miyake et
al., 2000), a broad definition of cognitive ability is a conservative approach to finding
what may predict response bias because the literature thus far has used many different
tasks. Their commonality appears to be a construct that includes the capacity to store,
process, and manipulate information. For example, Zhu et al. (2010a) found that the
cognitive factors of low intelligence, low perception, and low memory led to more false
memories in the misinformation paradigm, and working memory capacity showed a
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negative relationship to false memory in the DRM paradigm. Watson, Bunting, Poole,
and Conway (2005) proposed that working memory capacity influenced cognitive control
and task goal maintenance because high working memory span individuals were able to
integrate experimenter-provided warnings about false memory into a goal to reduce their
false memory, but low span individuals were unable to do this. This goal maintenance
and cognitive control could serve to minimize the influence of non-optimal response bias.
Even studies on personality predictors of false memory seem to indicate that
cognitive ability is important: in another study, Zhu and colleagues (2010) found that
several personality measures interacted with lower cognitive ability, as measured on
several tests including working memory, to lead to more false memories in the
misinformation effect: low fear of negative evaluation, low harm avoidance, high
cooperativeness, high reward dependence, and high self-directedness. Need for
Cognition, which is a measure of how much people tend to desire thinking or effortful
cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), also predicts more susceptibility to false memory in
DRM (Graham, 2007). Generally, cognition and cognitive ability appear to be important
in predicting false memory.
While there is evidence that cognitive ability predicts false memory, which may
be related to response bias, it’s important to also see if cognitive ability predicts response
bias directly in veridical memory. Understanding false memory can lead to greater
understanding of episodic memory generally, but individual differences may also affect
veridical memory. An important first step is to see how individual differences manifest in
the more common, general episodic memory paradigms in the absence of specific
manipulations before understanding how they may interact with response bias
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manipulations.
Veridical memory. The extant research on individual differences in response bias
approaches the research question in disparate ways. For example, Gillespie and Eysenck
(1980) calculated response bias in a continuous recognition paradigm at two levels, strict
response bias and lax response bias. They found that there was no difference between
introverts and extraverts at the lax criterion, but that introverts were more conservative
than extraverts at the strict criterion. This double stratification where individual
differences (introverts and extraverts) in response bias (conservative and liberal) are
examined within a particular range of bias (strict and lax criteria) is difficult to interpret
and compare to more recent studies since it is an uncommon approach to measuring
differences in response bias. Another approach, taken by Kantner and Lindsay (2012,
2014), was to use response bias in a standard recognition task to predict performance on
other tasks. They found that conservative response bias in a standard recognition task
weakly predicted fewer identifications in an eyewitness identification task (Kantner &
Lindsay, 2014) and less false recall in a DRM paradigm (Kantner & Lindsay, 2012).
In one examination of individual differences in standard episodic recognition,
Kantner and Lindsay (2012) examined which personality measures might predict
response bias. They failed to find any relationship to personality measures like Need for
Cognition, Behavior Inhibition and Avoidance Scales (BIS/BAS) which is a measure of
how people tend to view approach/reward and avoidance/punishment (Carver & White,
1994), nor Maximizing and Regret which is a measure of how people try to maximize
rewards or tend to just have a threshold of acceptability (Schwartz et al., 2002). Another
example of the research into individual differences in response bias was conducted by
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Aminoff and colleagues (2012) who specifically measured individual differences in
response bias from a base rate manipulation. They looked at army officers and some
graduate students, and presented words and faces to be remembered. At test, items were
color coded as having a 70% probability of being old or as having a 30% probability of
being old. Interestingly, this manipulation was done within list, though there is evidence
that participants do not readily shift criterion within list (Stretch & Wixted, 1998). They
found that some individuals were "high shifters" who employed widely variable response
bias and others were "low shifters" who were more resistant to the bias manipulation.
Aminoff and colleagues reported that shifting of response bias was mediated by d’.
Shifting was also mediated by self-reported reliance on probabilistic cue information, and
personality, specifically, the fun-seeking personality measure from BIS/BAS and
negative affect from the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) (Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988). More recent work by Jonker (2016) demonstrated that individual
differences in source memory also predict response bias. Participants were shown
category-exemplar pairs (e.g., “FRUIT-apple”) at study, and then at test, cued with the
category and asked to provide the exemplar. Then, participants were asked to rate their
confidence that the item they provided was studied, which can be thought of as a memory
for the source of the item, though conceptualized by Jonker primarily as a metamemory
task. The accuracy of their source memory predicted response bias: participants who had
lower source memory were more conservative. This runs counter to the other research
that generally indicates lower cognition and cognitive ability leads to more liberal
response bias, but it does provide further evidence for the relevance of those predictors in
response bias.
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Individual differences in response bias in reasoning
Though memory and reasoning are usually considered to be different domains,
there is good reason to believe that they are related and that individual difference findings
in one field could generalize to the other. For example, Heit and Hayes (2011) conducted
eight experiments using the same stimuli for recognition memory and inductive reasoning
tasks and found that performance on these tasks was very highly correlated across items.
They argued that reasoning and recognition memory include an aspect of comparing
novel and familiar stimuli. Individual differences in response bias would presumably
affect both reasoning and memory, as both include these decision processes.
Indeed, Heit, Rotello, & Hayes (2012) argued that memory and reasoning are
analogous and dependent on common mechanisms. Though they also presented data that
showed that participants were significantly more liberal in a reasoning task than in the
memory task, there could still be an effect of individual differences; this was not
specifically explored in that study.
While the authors of studies of individual differences in reasoning rarely
explicitly discuss the tasks' relationships to response bias in particular (Stupple, Ball, &
Ellis, 2013; Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011), there is reason to believe that
even some standard reasoning tasks may be more related to response bias than at first
glance. In particular, the belief bias effect warrants closer examination as an indicator of
response bias. The belief bias effect occurs when participants are more likely to rate the
conclusion of a syllogism as logically valid if the conclusion is believable, regardless of
whether it follows logically. For example, consider whether the conclusion of this
syllogism is logically valid:
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If some doctors are surgeons,
And no women are surgeons,
*Then, some women are not doctors. (Gilinsky & Judd, 1994, pg. 360)
Though this is actually an invalid conclusion based on the premises presented,
participants are more likely to rate this conclusion valid because that sentence coincides
with prior knowledge and is believable: there are indeed some women who are not
doctors. Historically, this has been described as an effect on reasoning accuracy (that
participants are less accurate when the conclusion is believable than when the conclusion
is unbelievable), but there is reason to believe the commonly used measure of accuracy is
inappropriate and conflates discriminability and response bias (Dube et al., 2010). Dube,
and colleagues (2010) found that when using the appropriate measures, which are the
signal detection measures mentioned earlier, the belief bias effect is shown to be a
response bias rather than a true accuracy effect. Believable conclusions shift participants'
response biases towards "valid." Accordingly, individual differences in belief bias
performance should approximate the individual differences in response bias in reasoning.
Generally, the individual differences in belief bias are consistent across
experiments and with the previously discussed predictors of individual differences in
response bias. Namely, working memory capacity and cognitive ability appear to predict
performance in the belief bias paradigm. Participants high in cognitive ability are more
accurate in the belief bias paradigm (Handley & Trippas, 2015; Newstead, Handley,
Harley, Wright, & Farrelly, 2004; Sá, West, & Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 2008;
Trippas, Handley, & Verde, 2013, 2014; Trippas, Verde, & Handley, 2014). Trippas and
colleagues found that participants low in cognitive ability show a more liberal response
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bias to believable conclusions (Trippas, Verde, et al., 2014). This provides converging
evidence that cognitive ability is important in response bias.
Thus, a common theme appears in reasoning as in memory: working
memory/cognitive ability are important factors that explain individual differences in
response bias. Indeed, a few studies show that response bias in memory tasks is relatively
stable within individuals and could be thought of as a cognitive trait (Aminoff et al.,
2012; Kantner & Lindsay, 2012, 2014). Given this stability and the consistent findings of
the importance of cognitive ability, it seems that more should be done to establish the
nature of the relationship.
Though some authors like Kantner and Lindsay (2012) have argued that
individual differences in response bias are not worth studying if it is not a large effect, it
is essential to explore individual differences in memory not only because doing so will
allow for a fuller understanding of cognition, but also because the "extra noise" of
individual differences reduces the power of finding the true underlying common
processes. In particular, it is important to look at individual difference in response bias in
memory because response bias affects behavioral measures of memory, "contamination"
from these individual differences may affect parameter interpretation, and differences in
response bias affect the assumptions and understanding of bias manipulations in
experimental design. Understanding individual differences in response bias, and in
particular those related to working memory and cognitive ability, can enrich
understanding of cognitive processes and should be explored further. This research will
provide some much-needed data that will allow for greater theoretical development in the
future.
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The overarching research purpose for this study is to take those steps towards
understanding individual differences in response bias by examining the role of cognitive
ability in response bias. In particular, this study looks at cognitive ability, memory, and
reasoning and also seeks to answer whether cognitive ability can predict the optimality of
response bias. That is, does cognitive ability predict response bias in both reasoning and
memory, and do higher cognitive ability individuals choose a more optimal response
bias?
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CHAPTER 2
EXPERIMENT 1
In order to establish whether individual differences in cognitive ability predict
response bias in both memory and reasoning, several measures of cognitive ability, a
standard recognition memory task, and a standard belief bias reasoning task were
administered to both a large online sample and a laboratory sample for comparison. For
both the memory and reasoning task, I predicted that increased difficulty, defined by
conditions that have historically been thought to decrease discriminability, would lead to
more liberal absolute response bias/more false alarms (Hirshman, 1995) and conversely,
lower difficulty to more conservative absolute response bias. Furthermore, I predicted
that cognitive ability would influence response bias: higher cognitive ability participants
may be better able to maintain the implicit task goal of maximizing accuracy, and
therefore adjust their response bias accordingly to the difficulty of the task.
Specifically, in the memory task, I predicted that participants would have a more
conservative absolute response bias in the stronger condition than in the weaker
condition because they would be able to easily reduce false alarms without negatively
impacting hits (Hirshman, 1995). Hirshman found that participants were more
conservative when items had been presented for 2 seconds in comparison to when items
had been presented for only 400 ms, consistent with the hypothesis that participants
generate the possible range of memory strength for strong, weak, and new items at test
and place their criterion accounting for that range. While he found effects using relative
response bias c, predicting such effects on c in the current study actually requires a strong
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assumption about the effect. When discriminability increases, c = 0 shifts along the axis
towards the target distribution, i.e., more conservative in absolute space. So in order to
see a significant effect of c becoming more conservative in this strong condition, the shift
in absolute space must equal the already more conservative shift of c = 0 plus an
additional shift relative to c. Though I did not manipulate strength via the rate of
presentation in the current experiment, manipulating strength with repetition should lead
to a similar result: repeated items will lead to more conservative response bias. Because I
do not make as strong an assumption about how large the shift must be, I predict only that
there will be a shift in absolute response bias.
Beyond the main effect of repetition on response bias, I predicted that higher
cognitive ability participants would be even better at adjusting their criterion depending
on the difficulty of the condition while maximizing accuracy: more conservative with an
easier condition.
In the reasoning task, I predicted that participants would have more liberal
response bias in the believable condition than in the unbelievable condition (Dube et al.,
2010; Trippas, Handley, et al., 2014). Though this prediction was phrased in the opposite
format as the prediction for the memory task, the trend is in the same direction. The
believable condition in the belief bias task is assumed by several theories to be more
difficult than the unbelievable condition, potentially because one must override the
believability of the syllogism in order to accurately judge the validity (e.g., Oakhill,
Johnson-Laird, & Garnham, 1989; Stupple et al., 2011). While the actual effect on
discriminability may not be real (Dube et al., 2010) and so the “more difficult” label may
not be accurate, the prediction of the effect on response bias is also a replication of Dube
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and colleagues.
Beyond the main effect of believability on response bias, I predicted that higher
cognitive ability participants would be better at adjusting their criterion while
maximizing accuracy; these participants would be able to respond appropriately to the
task (Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2010): more conservative with an “easier” condition. In
other words, higher cognitive ability participants were predicted to be more conservative
in the “easier” condition of the recognition task (stronger/more repetitions) and in the
reasoning task (unbelievable conclusions) than lower cognitive ability participants
because higher cognitive ability participants would be able to respond appropriately to
the task in order to maximize accuracy. However, the amount of shifting was predicted to
be different in the memory and reasoning tasks. Specifically, higher cognitive ability
participants would be expected to shift their bias more in the memory task in order to
appropriately adjust to the task. However, in the reasoning task, this bias shift is not
actually appropriate; higher cognitive ability participants should not shift their bias as
much to be so liberal in the believable conclusion. Thus, though the amount of shifting
predicted might be different, the underlying reason for that shift (responding
appropriately to the task) remains the same, and I hypothesized that higher cognitive
ability participants would be better at this.
Method
Participants
Because most samples in cognitive research come from the college student
population, 103 participants from the University of Massachusetts recruited through the
SONA website for the Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences were initially run

28

in this experiment. Of those participants, 63 were dropped due to researcher error in
programming the conditions, the randomization, and the counterbalancing of stimuli,
which left a remaining sample of 40 participants, which is a sample size consistent with
previous research on individual differences in response bias (Kantner & Lindsay, 2012).
Every participant received credit for their participation. The lab sample mostly served as
comparison to the online sample to ensure there would be no major differences in sample
and therefore generalizability.
In order to achieve sufficient power, a much larger sample was recruited online
through Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk via TurkPrime, a website designed to interface
more clearly and easily with Mechanical Turk. Only Mechanical Turk “workers” with an
IP address in the U.S. were able to participate, and eligibility was further determined with
a prescreening survey administered through Qualtrics (a survey site) which paid 5 cents
for answering 5 questions; if participants were eligible for the study, they were provided
with a link to the “bonus” study administered through IbexFarm (a JavaScript-based
programming language and host site) that would pay $3 for the rest of the experiment,
estimated to take one hour. This payment was estimated to be comparable to other
similarly timed tasks on Mechanical Turk: not as low as other tasks, but not too high as to
be coercively enticing.
The prescreening survey asked about age and whether the participant had taken
the SAT or ACT and could report the year and their score. An age restriction of 18-30
years old was chosen so that the online sample would be more comparable to the lab
sample; this restriction was in the initial description. If participants reported an age
outside of the acceptable range, they were shown a message that indicated they were not
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eligible for the study. The other main eligibility determinant was self-reported SAT
and/or ACT score and year, which was one of the measures of cognitive ability, discussed
in more detail below. If participants reported scores and years that were not plausible
(e.g., scoring higher than maximum 36 on the ACT or testing in 1992 when the oldest
allowed participant would have been 6 years old), they were shown a message that
indicated they were not eligible for the bonus but could still receive payment for the
prescreening. In other words, the responses to the prescreening served as a gatekeeper to
the bonus survey and bonus money. Of the 1,024 participants who completed a
prescreening to determine eligibility, 452 participants were eligible. Of these, only 350 of
those participants were eligible and completed the full experiment.
Participants were excluded from analysis based on several factors. Two exclusion
criterion were selected to ensure that the individual differences measures were
meaningful. Specifically, participants who reported an implausible SAT/ACT score that
had gotten through the Qualtrics filters, such as an SAT score that was not divisible by 10
but within the plausible range, were excluded. This applied to 21 online participants but
none of the lab participants. Similarly, participants who performed poorly on the Go/NoGo task (described below), that is, lower than d’ of 0.5, were also excluded; this applied
to an additional 19 online participants and 1 lab participant. There were also two
exclusion criteria set for the behavioral responses. First, median reaction times in the
Number-Letter task (described below) that were less than 800 ms were assumed to
indicate a failure to engage seriously with the task, and likewise median RTs greater than
2000 ms were assumed to indicate that the participant was probably distracted. However,
no participants were excluded based on median RTs. Finally, participants were excluded
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if their confidence ratings and decision accuracy levels were not systematically related.
Higher confidence responses should be more accurate than lower confidence responses
(e.g., Wixted, Mickes, Dunn, Clark, & Wells, 2016). With a cut-off of percent correct
being at least 10% greater in the highest confidence responses than the lowest confidence
responses, 99 online participants and 10 lab participants for the memory task were
excluded, as well as 32 online participants and 8 lab participants for the reasoning task.
The remaining 179 online participants and 21 lab participants were included in the
analyses.
Cognitive Ability Measures. To measure cognitive ability, multiple commonly used
measures were used, since various measures have been used across different studies. It
was assumed that these measures would relate enough to be considered convergent
measures of cognitive ability.
Standardized academic testing. The first measure was self-reported SAT or ACT scores
and the year in which they took the test. This has been used in previous studies as a proxy
for cognitive ability (Naemi, Beal, & Payne, 2009; Stanovich & West, 1998, 2008). As
mentioned above, online participants were excluded if they did not self-report plausible
scores or years; lab participants, who were all undergraduates, were also required to selfreport their scores/years.
Executive control. Working memory capacity tasks such as the common OSPAN task
(Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005) can be particularly difficult to administer
online due to the potential lack of understanding the instructions, the potential for
cheating by using external aids instead of memory, and the difficult implementation of
the task calibrations based on performance. While working memory capacity has been
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commonly used as a measure of cognitive ability, for practical reasons, I used tasks that
are related to a component of working memory: executive control.
According to the commonly used working memory model proposed by Baddeley
and Hitch (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 1996), the non-storage component of
working memory is the central executive. Miyake and colleagues (2000) characterized
executive functioning in three components: inhibition (of prepotent responses); shifting
between mental information; and updating or adjusting monitored information. The
current study measured inhibition and shifting in individuals as a measure of cognitive
ability.
Inhibition. While working memory capacity could be difficult to measure online, a
Go/No-Go task could be appropriate to use instead: Redick, Calvo, Gay, and Engle
(2011) found that working memory capacity, as measured by complex span tasks
including OSPAN, was highly related to performance on a conditional Go/No-Go task. In
addition to the findings of Redick and colleagues, further reason to use this task to
measure cognitive ability came from Kantner and Lindsay (2014) who found evidence
that response bias was predicted by a standard Go/No-Go task. Accordingly, it seemed
reasonable to use this task, especially if working memory capacity measures would not be
practical for an online sample.
In the conditional Go/No-Go task (Redick et al., 2011) used in this study,
participants saw a series of single letters presented on the screen for 300 ms each
followed by a blank screen for 700 ms during which they could also respond. They were
told to respond to X, then, Y, then X, etc., regardless of whatever letters were presented
in between, including duplicate Xs or Ys. When they saw any letter other than X or Y,
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they were not supposed to respond (distractor trial), nor when there was a duplicate X or
Y from when they last responded (lure trial). So if they saw the series “X, H, Y, Y,” they
should have responded to the X (target trial), not responded to the H (distractor trial),
responded to the Y (lure trial) because the previous instance of a target letter was the
other letter, but not responded to the second Y (lure trial) because the previous instance
of a target letter was the same letter. In each of three blocks, there were 80 target trials,
20 lure trials, and 100 distractor trials. Accuracy was calculated with d’ based on hits
from target trials and false alarms from lure trials. Performance on a practice with
feedback was not included in the accuracy score.
Shifting. The third measure of cognitive ability was the Number-Letter task, a task of the
shifting component of executive functioning (Miyake et al., 2000). In this task as
implemented by Miyake and colleagues, participants saw a number-letter pair in the top
half of the screen or the bottom half of the screen. For pairs in the top half, they were
asked to indicate whether the number was odd or even, and for pairs in the bottom half,
they were asked to indicate whether the letter was a vowel or a consonant. This was cued
with an instruction 150 ms before seeing the pair, with the instruction and pair staying on
the screen until the participant replied after which there was a 350 ms blank screen before
the next trial. In each of two blocks, there were 24 no-shift trials (trials where the
previous task was the same) and 24 shift trials (trials where the previous task was
different). The cost in reaction times of shifting between the number and letter task in
relation to answering two number (or two letter) tasks in a row indicated a general ability
to shift tasks.
Cognitive tasks
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Memory task. The memory task included two conditions: words presented one time (1x)
and words presented three times (3x). There were two study-test lists for each condition,
with each study list containing 40 words presented for one second at a time. The words
were 4 to 7 letter nouns, ranging in frequency from 5 – 787, with a mean of 49.07, taken
from the MRC psycholinguistic database (Coltheart, 1981). For each test list, there were
40 targets/old words and 40 lures/new words. Participants responded on a six-point
confidence scale the extent to which they were sure that an item appeared or did not
appear on the study list from “very sure new” to “very sure old”.
Reasoning task. The reasoning task included 32 syllogisms with 8 each of: valid and
believable, valid and not believable, invalid and believable, and valid and not believable
conclusions. These syllogisms were taken from Experiment 2 of Dube et al. (2010) which
minimized effects of atmosphere and figure. The semantic content was counterbalanced,
and the middle term in the premises (the noun that was not in the conclusion) was a
nonsense word in order to reduce the believability of the premises. Participants responded
on a six-point confidence scale the extent to which they were sure that the conclusion of
the syllogism is logically valid from “very sure invalid” to “very sure valid”.
Results
Variable Measurement, Approach to Analyses, and Hypotheses
The dependent variables of interest were absolute criterion location and relative
criterion location, response bias variability as measured by the standard deviation of the
respective measures across the conditions in individuals, and the total magnitude of the
shift as measured by the range of the respective measures for each individual.
It should also be noted that the manipulations here, especially the repetition of
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stimuli in the memory task, usually increase accuracy. Finding individual differences in
accuracy would not be problematic for the current experiments, and indeed would
provide a manipulation check. Still, the primary focus of the analyses was on response
bias rather than accuracy.
Approach to Analyses and Hypotheses
Cognitive ability was based on a composite score of SAT/ACT test score
(converted to percentiles based on the year taken, which was then averaged if the
participant took both tests), Go/No-Go accuracy (d’ calculated with hits on target trials
and false alarms on lure trials), and Number-Letter shifting cost (calculated by
subtracting reaction time on no shift trials from reaction time on shift trials). Each
individual’s score on each task was converted to a z-score; these scores were then
averaged to form a composite score on which the median split was based.
The composite score of cognitive ability was hypothesized to predict differences
in response bias in the recognition and belief bias tasks. For each task and dependent
variable, I conducted a 2-level hierarchical linear model (HLM) with condition at the
level 1 and the individual at level 2, including cognitive ability as a predictor.
Hierarchical linear models are linear models that account for the natural nesting that may
occur in the data (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). For example, a mixed design study
includes data from multiple time points that are nested within the individual, while
individuals are nested in groups. Hierarchical linear modeling not only accounts for the
related variance due to such nesting, but also allows for predictors at each level of
nesting. It can also be used as another approach to ANCOVA, where a covariate would
occur at the level of the individual, and the factors of interest at the relevant level. That is,
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while an ANCOVA would allow for both categorical predictors (condition) and
continuous covariates (cognitive ability), this fails to capture the nested design:
conditions are nested within individuals, which HLM allows to be explicitly modeled.
Using hierarchical linear modeling allows for predictors at the individual level in a
repeated measures design.
For the recognition memory task, I predicted that more repetition would lead to
more conservative absolute response bias as Hirshman (1995) found, but more relevantly
to my main research question, I predicted an interaction of cognitive ability and repetition
such that higher cognitive ability participants would be particularly more conservative
with more repetition. For the belief bias task. I predicted that believable conclusions
would lead to more liberal response bias as Dube et al. (2010) found. I also predicted that
there would be an interaction of cognitive ability and believability such that lower
cognitive ability participants are particularly more liberal in responding that a syllogism
is valid if it is believable. Thus, I predicted that individual differences in cognitive ability
would predict absolute response bias in the memory and the reasoning tasks.
The results from the three measures of cognitive ability are presented first;
comparing the performance in these tasks between the online and lab sample helps to
determine the appropriateness of the online sample. Next, I present simple correlations of
response bias in the tasks without accounting for cognitive ability. Then, I show the
results from the accuracy tests accounting for cognitive ability to confirm that a median
split sufficiently divided the two ability levels; these results also provide a check of the
manipulations. Lastly, I show the results from the response bias tests accounting for
cognitive ability.
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Measures of Cognitive Ability
Performance in the three cognitive ability tasks, Go/No-Go accuracy, NumberLetter shifting cost, and SAT/ACT test score percentile, are shown in Figure 4. The
histograms show performance on the tasks, and the scatterplots show the relationships of
the tasks with each other. The online sample, with the 179 included participants, is in the
left column and the lab sample, with the 21 included participants, is in the right column.
Online/MTurk Participants

Lab Participants
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Figure 4. Histograms of performance on the cognitive ability task and scatterplots of their
correlations in Experiment 1.
Go/No-Go task performance was not entirely consistent across the two samples.
Notably, participants in the lab sample scored much better than those online; no online
participant scored above d’ = 2.5, but many participants in the lab had d’ scores of 3-4.
With perfect performance in this task yielding a d’ of 4.48, such high scores in the lab
sample may indicate ceiling effects, but it is also likely that the online participants lost
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motivation to perform well or attention in this task in a different way than lab participants
who had the demand characteristics of participating in a lab with a research assistant in
the next room. No feedback was gathered in Experiment 1, but in Experiment 2, which
also included the Go/No-Go task, many online participants expressed their fatigue or
frustration with the tedium in this task. Because this task was timed rather than selfpaced, participants who grew fatigued or lost attention could simply stop responding and
allow the task to finish. It seems unlikely, though, that the difference in performance on
this task between the online and lab samples reflects a true difference in cognitive ability,
based on the other metrics of cognitive ability included. And indeed, when participants
did respond, those reaction times were very similar in the online sample and the lab
sample (seen in Figure 5). While the discrepancy in the overall accuracy between the two
samples is a concern for the validity of the measure, it appears to reflect a systematic
difference in motivation rather than an actual difference in ability between the online and
lab samples.

Figure 5. Distribution of reaction times in the Go/No-Go task in Experiment 1.
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The distribution of SAT/ACT percentiles was also not the same in the two
samples: there are many more scores in the lower tail in the online sample. Because
admissions to universities usually require a minimum standardized test score, the
distribution in the lab sample, taken from a university setting, must be truncated in the
left tail in comparison to the online sample. Still, it was clear that online participants’
reports of their scores were occasionally intentionally misrepresented, likely motivated
by the fact that the SAT/ACT responses were a gatekeeper to whether participants could
proceed to the rest of the task and therefore earn a much larger payment. The Qualtrics
survey was intended to screen out impossible responses or unlikely years (say, if a 30
year old reported taking the SAT in 1994, when he would have been around 8 years old),
and further screening criteria were implemented as mentioned above, but it is impossible
to be certain that all individuals who provided inaccurate test scores were removed from
the data.
More reassuringly, the discrepancies in the aforementioned cognitive ability tasks
were not evident in the Number-Letter task. This may be an indication that the NumberLetter task had fewer artifacts, perhaps because the task was self-paced, and participants,
regardless of sample, would likely be motivated to be finished with the study. Reaction
times in the Number-Letter task were trimmed as Friedman et al. (2009) suggested: only
correct responses with reaction time greater than 200 ms were included, and with further
trimming for responses where the reaction time was more than 3.32 times more extreme
than the median absolute deviation (i.e., 3.32 times the median value of the absolute
deviations from the median) in the (shift or no shift) condition. This last criterion mostly
trimmed out extremely long reaction times because median absolute deviation is a robust
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measure of outliers; in Gaussian distributions, the median absolute deviation is equivalent
of 1.48 times the standard deviation (Rousseeuw & Croux, 1993), so using 3.32 times the
median absolute deviation as a cut-off would remove values more extreme than roughly
4.91 standard deviations.
There was only one significant correlation among the three measures of cognitive
ability in only the online sample: Number-Letter performance was significantly
correlated with SAT/ACT score, r(177) = -0.16, p = 0.03 (seen in Figure 4). The lack of
other significant correlations across the tasks could be further indication of the known
measurement error in the SAT/ACT and Go/No-Go task in the online task, implicating
issues with the current study, and could also be of concern because the tasks were used to
measure cognitive ability together. However, the absence of clear evidence that these
cognitive tasks measure the same underlying construct has also been reported in other
studies. Miyake et al. (2000) did not use a conditional Go/No-Go task as was used in the
current study, but they did include other measures of inhibition such as the anti-saccade
(Roberts, Hager, & Heron, 1994), stop signal (Logan, 1994), and Stroop task (Stroop,
1935), and they found no significant correlations of those tasks with the Number-Letter
task. Indeed the thrust of their paper was that the lack of significant correlations but
significant structural equation model suggested that there were distinct aspects of
executive functioning: inhibition was separate from shifting. It is very likely that the
Go/No-Go task, which is a classic measure of response inhibition, maps onto the
inhibition component of executive functioning; indeed, it is presumed to do so, for
example, by the many studies that use the task to localize inhibition in imaging research
(e.g., Simmonds, Pekar, & Mostofsky, 2008). While this does not eliminate the issues of
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validity in the current experiment, the general construct of cognitive ability as measured
here is not necessarily problematic.
Measures of Response Bias
As a check on the effect of repetition and believability in the memory and
reasoning tasks respectively, response bias was measured by the location of the criterion
and the variability in the location of the criterion. In order to get these measures, the
unequal-variance signal detection model was fit to the full ROC for each participant and
each condition. While the memory data were easily fit to the unequal-variance signal
detection model, this was not the case for the reasoning data. An explanation of the issue
follows.
When participants do not use every confidence level, the ROC points are
clustered. As explained in the introduction, each point is a cumulative sum of the hits and
false alarms for all responses more conservative than that confidence level. For example,
if a participant has a 0.25 hit rate and 0.12 false alarm rate using the most conservative
confidence/”very sure old” level and 0.12 hit rate and 0 false alarm rate with the second
most conservative confidence/”sure old” level, the first two points on the ROC, plotted
false alarm rate on the x-axis and hit rate on the y-axis, would fall on (0.12, 0.25) and
(0.12, 0.37). In other words, there would be 2 points in a vertical line. As this clustering
increases due to unused confidence levels (for example, participants who only use the
extremes of the scale), it becomes very difficult for the model to fit the data, including
that the model is unable to appropriately determine the ratio of standard deviations from
the target-to-lure distributions, i.e., the slope. Without this, the estimates of ca are
difficult to interpret.
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Clustering of points on the ROC was a particular problem in the reasoning task.
Because there were only 8 trials per item type in each condition, participants were
unlikely to respond the full confidence scale (6-items) on each of these 8-trial cells, and
indeed only about half of online participants used the full scale in the whole task at all, let
alone for each condition and item type.
Because the estimates of ca in the reasoning task were therefore flawed, three
alternative approaches were considered. First, I could collapse across any confidence
levels where that clustering would occur. This would give a different number of criteria
than assuming all 6 confidence levels were used, but it would still allow me to analyze
the relevant ca as long as there were 3 confidence levels remaining (the minimum needed
to estimate the slope). Unfortunately, over 93% of the reasoning data failed to meet this
minimum requirement. Second, I could assume group participants into lower and higher
cognitive ability and assume a common slope for the group. That is, I could collapse
across the lower cognitive ability participants, find the slope of their ROC for the
condition, and then use that slope to fit the individual data (and same for the higher
cognitive ability participants). This would allow analyses of ca, as in the memory task,
but it would have the drawback of assuming that this slope is constant across participants
in a given ability level. Third, I could assume an equal-variance signal detection model
and analyze c. This would not assume differences were constant across subgroups, but it
would have the drawback of assuming the slope is 1, the same for all participants. Much
of the prior research using signal detection models for the belief bias task uses the
unequal-variance model (e.g., Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2010; Trippas, Handley, & Verde,
2013), but there is some recent research to indicate that it is appropriate to assume equal
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variance for this task (Trippas, Kellen, Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2016). This
research is not yet peer-reviewed or published, though.
While none of these would be ideal solutions, the limitations in the data led me to
assume the equal-variance signal detection model and use c. Specifically, when I
attempted the group slopes approach, there was virtually no difference between using ca
and c: the group slopes only changed the calculations of ca out to the thousandth decimal.
Unfortunately, using group slopes did not resolve the main problem with these data: with
participants using so few confidence levels, the ROC was nearly impossible to fit
appropriately. The da estimates from the ROC fits would therefore not provide accurate
estimates of discriminability. The only solution left was to assume the equal-variance
signal detection model for the reasoning task, which is what will be presented.
Response bias was measured by absolute criterion location λ for all conditions
and tasks and relative criterion location ca/c for memory and reasoning respectively. For
both λ and ca/c, analyses were conducted on the location and on criterion location
variability, measured with the range of criterion location calculated by subtracting the
smallest from the largest. Because the memory task included two lists per condition, the
standard deviation of criterion location across all four lists was also used as another
measure of criterion location variability. In contrast, the reasoning task did not have
multiple lists per condition, so a measure of standard deviation would provide the same
information as the already included range. Accordingly, no analyses of the standard
deviation in reasoning are presented.
Though not the major innovation of this experiment, there were significant
correlations of relative criterion location, which replicated prior research. For example,
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previous findings show that response bias in memory is relatively stable across test lists
despite up to week-long delays (Kantner & Lindsay, 2012, 2014). They measured relative
response bias ca, and indeed, the strong correlations of criterion location ca in the four
memory test lists (seen in Figure 6) clearly replicates this, though there was virtually no
delay between lists in the current experiment. For both the online sample and the lab
sample, there is a clear positive relationship in the scatterplots in the lower triangle of
Figure 6, and the correlations of the criterion locations, seen in the upper triangle, are all
highly significant.

Figure 6. Scatterplot matrices of absolute response bias ca in each of the four test lists in
the memory task in Experiment 1.
Unlike in memory, relative response bias in reasoning was not correlated between
the two conditions (see in Figure 7 the scatterplot in the third column/fourth row for the
online sample and the lab sample respectively). This result is somewhat surprising given
that the conditions were presented within the same list, suggesting that the relationship
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between the relative criterion location in the believable and unbelievable conditions may
be more complicated than can be depicted with a simple correlation. Participants were
expected to have a more liberal bias in the believable condition than the unbelievable
(Dube et al., 2010); in the relevant scatterplots in Figure 7 as mentioned, this would mean
points are mostly in the lower right hand portion of the plot, or points below a slope of 1
(i.e., a more liberal/lower numerical bias in the believable condition than the unbelievable
condition). However, if the extent to which participants shift their bias is not consistent
across participants, a correlation would not be expected to emerge. For example, a
participant who has a very conservative bias in the unbelievable may shift a little bit (so
their point would be in the upper right hand corner of the plot), or a lot (so their point
would be in the lower right hand corner of the plot). Depending on the range of “starting”
biases in the unbelievable condition and the size of shift, a simple correlation could show
no relationship in overall location between the conditions. Indeed, this is further rationale
to examine the individual differences that might explain response bias.

Figure 7. Scatterplot matrices of response bias in the memory and reasoning tasks in
Experiment 1.
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The correlations across memory and reasoning tasks care shown in the four
scatterplots in the bottom left hand corners for the online and the lab samples in Figure 7.
There were two significant correlations in only the lab sample: response bias in both the
1x memory condition and in the 3x memory condition correlated with unbelievable
reasoning condition. However, there was an influential point that shows a very liberal
criterion in both of these correlations (the point in the bottom left hand corner of each
respective scatterplot). Without this outlying participant, the correlation is no longer
significant (for the correlation of unbelievable reasoning response bias with the 1x
memory response bias, r(18) = 0.39, p = 0.08, and for with the 3x memory response bias,
r(18) = 0.24, p = 0.31).
Still, the correlations shown in Figure 7 did not account for cognitive ability as a
potential predictor for individual differences in response bias: those analyses are
presented next.
Accuracy Analyses
First, I checked that cognitive ability and condition led to the predicted effects on
accuracy. That is, cognitive ability should lead to increased memory performance (e.g.,
Unsworth, 2010) and repetition should lead to higher memory accuracy, (e.g.,
Ebbinghaus, 1913), and higher cognitive ability participants should differ in their
susceptibility to believable conclusions (Trippas et al., 2013; Trippas et al., 2014).
In order to test this, I used hierarchical linear models which included the withinsubjects factor of condition as a binary predictor at the lowest level (level 1), and
cognitive ability as a continuous predictor at level 2. β weights in the hierarchical model
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and interpretation of significant weights are presented below.
Memory
The measure of accuracy in the memory task was da. In the online sample,
cognitive ability significantly predicted memory performance: higher cognitive ability
participants had greater discriminability, β = 0.21, t(177) = 2.49, p = 0.01. However, this
was not seen in the lab sample, β = 0.19, t(19) = 1.24, p = 0.23. This effect is likely
underpowered given the small sample of only 21 participants, but it is in the same
direction as the online sample. In both samples, there was also a significant effect of
condition, as predicted, where more repetition led to greater discriminability (online
sample: β = 0.42, t(177) = 9.47, p < 0.001, lab sample: β = 0.60, t(19) = 6.26, p < 0.001).
Thus, condition predicted accuracy in both samples, but only the online sample had
sufficient power to detect that cognitive ability predict accuracy.
Reasoning
In reasoning, the measure of accuracy was d’. In the online sample, higher
cognitive ability participants had greater discriminability, β = 0.34, t(177) = 3.10, p =
0.002, and unbelievable conclusions led to higher discriminability than believable
conclusions, β = 0.32, t(177) = 4.43, p < 0.001. The effect of believability on
discriminability does run counter to Dube et al.’s (2010) findings that there was no effect
on accuracy.
However, the key prediction here was that different cognitive ability participants
would have different effects of believability on their accuracy (Trippas et al., 2013,
2014). This was not significant in the online sample: higher cognitive ability participants
were only marginally significantly affected by the believability, β = -0.20, t(177) = -1.66,
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p < 0.10. The results were different for the lab sample, though. Neither ability nor
condition were significant alone, but there was a significant effect of ability on condition
in the lab sample. Specifically, higher cognitive ability participants were significantly
more affected by the believability of the conclusion, β = 0.70, t(19) = 2.91, p = 0.009.
Indeed, this replicates Trippas and colleagues’ (2013, 2014) accuracy findings that higher
cognitive ability participants perform particularly better in the unbelievable condition, but
no such benefit exists for lower cognitive ability participants.
Given the small size of the lab sample, it is surprising to see this differential effect
of ability on the effect of believability accuracy with those participants, but not with the
online participants. This could indicate that the online sample and lab sample here are not
entirely comparable. While there is reason to believe that online samples are appropriate
for cognitive psychology research (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010), the discrepant
findings in the current experiment could be a fault of the sampling technique or they
could reflect meaningful differences in the populations. With the small lab sample, it is
difficult to reach strong conclusions about the relationship between the lab and online
data.
Response Bias Analyses
With indication that the measure of cognitive ability and the manipulations of
repetition and believability were appropriate, I then analyzed the effect of cognitive
ability on response bias. For both memory and reasoning, I conducted hierarchical linear
models and simple regressions on the measures of response bias, depending on the
number of relevant factors, respectively.
Memory
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For response bias, measured with absolute criterion location λ, participants should
be more conservative with increased repetition as Hirshman (1995) found; increasing
repetition should improve discriminability enough that participants could minimize false
alarms while still maintaining high accuracy. Additionally, I hypothesized that higher
cognitive ability participants would be more conservative with increased repetition.
However, this pattern was not observed for either absolute or relative measures of
criterion location.
Using absolute criterion location λ, there was only a significant effect of
condition: participants were more conservative with increased repetition (online sample:
β = 0.11, t(177) = 3.09, p = 0.002, lab sample: β = 0.27, t(19) = 4.36, p < 0.001). No other
effects were significant.
Using relative criterion location ca, there was a significant effect of repetition,
though in an unexpected direction: increased repetition led to a more liberal relative
response bias in the online sample (β = -0.10, t(177) = -4.78, p < 0.001). This effect was
marginally significant in the lab sample (β = -0.07, t(19) = 1.79, p = 0.09). No other
effects were significant.
That the effect is in the opposite direction when using ca at the measure of
response bias in the online sample does not necessarily contradict the findings in λ. As
was seen in the accuracy analyses, discriminability was not the same across conditions.
When discriminability is not the same, the point at which ca = 0 shifts its location along
the evidence axis. Thus, even when λ becomes more conservative, to see a similarly
conservative ca, the shift towards the conservative decision bound must be greater than
the baseline accounted for by the discriminability differences.
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The predictions here were about absolute response bias, but relative response bias
is important because the cognitive ability interactions predicted about absolute response
bias were motivated by the suggestion that higher cognitive ability participants are better
able to maximize optimality. A formal test of the optimality of response bias is further
explored later in Experiment 2.
In addition to hypotheses of ability and criterion location, I also hypothesized that
higher cognitive ability participants would shift their response bias more in order to
appropriately adjust for the difficulty of the task. However, this was not the case for
either measurement of range or standard deviation (sd) of either absolute criterion
location λ or relative criterion ca. This can be seen in the scatterplots in Figure 8 and the
statistics in Table 1.
Online/MTurk Participants

Lab Participants
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Figure 8. Plots of response bias variability, measured by range and standard
deviation of λ and ca at the old/new divide, in the memory task in Experiment 1.
Β
λ

range

Online Participants

-0.06 t(177) = -0.85, p = 0.40

Lab Participants
sd

ca

range

sd

Significance

0.03 t(19) = 0.21, p = 0.84

Online Participants

-0.02 t(177) = -0.74, p = 0.46

Lab Participants

0.02 t(19) = 0.41, p = 0.68

Online Participants

0.02 t(177) = 0.52, p = 0.61

Lab Participants

-0.11 t(19) = -1.45, p = 0.16

Online Participants

0.007 t(177) = 0.40, p =0.69

Lab Participants

-0.04 t(19) = -1.25, p = 0.23

Table 1. Summary of simple regression of cognitive ability as a predictor of variability of
response bias in memory in Experiment 1.
Reasoning
I hypothesized that there would be an interaction of cognitive ability and
believability such that lower cognitive ability participants would be particularly more
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liberal in the believable condition. This was not the case.
Using absolute criterion location λ, in the online sample, participants were
significantly more conservative in the unbelievable condition than the unbelievable
condition in the online sample (β = 0.87, t(177) = 13.03, p < 0.001), and the lab sample (β
= 0.60, t(19) = 3.20, p = 0.005), which replicated previous findings (Dube et al., 2010;
Trippas et al., 2013). Higher cognitive ability participants were more conservative in the
online sample (β = 0.23, t(177) = 2.21, p = 0.03), indicating a general effect of cognitive
ability on response bias. This effect was marginal in the lab sample (β = 0.50, t(19) =
1.83, p = 0.08). Though not significant in the online same, there was also a marginally
significant effect of ability on believability in the lab sample: higher cognitive ability
participants were less affected by believability of the conclusion than lower cognitive
ability participants (β = 0.66, t(19) = 2.03, p = 0.06). Thus, while I replicated the finding
of more liberal response bias in the believable condition (Dube et al., 2010; Dube,
Rotello, & Heit, 2011; Trippas et al., 2013), there was no clear evidence for an interaction
as I hypothesized: the effect was only marginally significant and only in the lab sample.
Using relative criterion location c, unbelievable conclusions led to more
conservative response bias than believable conclusions in both the online sample (β =
0.71, t(177) = 12.18, p < 0.001) and the lab sample (β = 0.60, t(19) = 3.23, p = 0.004).
However, there were no other significant effects.
As with the memory task, I hypothesized that higher cognitive ability participants
would shift their criterion in the reasoning task more to appropriately adjust for the
difficulty of the task. However, this was not the case, as can be seen in the scatterplots in
Figure 9 and in the statistics in Table 2. In the plot for range of λ in online participants,
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there are many points clustered in the lower right quadrant indicating participants with
higher cognitive ability and smaller range. This was the only significant effect in shifting:
higher cognitive ability participants shifted less.

Online/MTurk Participants

Lab Participants

Ran
ge
of λ

Ran
ge
of c

Figure 9. Plots of response bias variability, measured by range of λ and range of c at the
old/new divide, in the reasoning task in Experiment 1.
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Β
λ

c

Range

Range

Significance

Online Participants

-0.21 t(177) = -2.04, p = 0.04

Lab Participants

-0.28 t(19) = -1.08, p = 0.29

Online Participants

-0.09 t(177) = -1.06, p = 0.29

Lab Participants

-0.09 t(19) = -0.35, p = 0.73

Table 2. Summary of simple regression of cognitive ability as a predictor of variability of
response bias in reasoning in Experiment 1.
Experiment 1 Discussion
While there were indications of some differences between the online and lab
samples (different accuracy performance on the Go/No-Go task and greater spread in the
SAT/ACT scores), these likely indicate differences in motivation rather than in cognitive
ability. Other measures did appear to be qualititatively similar (similar distribution of
reaction times in the Number-Letter task and the Go/No-Go task), so it was deemed
appropriate to use both samples.
Examining effects on accuracy provided a manipulation check and indicated, as
predicted, that higher cognitive ability participants performed better in both the memory
and reasoning task, and repetition led to greater discriminability in memory, and
believable conclusions led to lower discriminability in reasoning. There was an
interaction of ability and believability in the lab sample, consistent with conclusions from
prior research (Trippas, Verde, et al., 2014), but not in the online sample. This could
reflect that cognitive ability is a very broad term used to describe multiple constructs
because they used different kinds of tasks than the ones used here. This could also
potentially reflect differences in the online and lab sample. However, the effect of ability
on accuracy indicates that it is a relevant individual difference here.
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The main hypotheses in the current experiment were on response bias. Without
accounting for cognitive ability, response bias remained stable in memory across lists,
replicating prior research (Kantner & Lindsay, 2012). Bias shifts due to the manipulation
in the tasks were significant and as expected: participants were more conservative in their
absolute response bias in the stronger memory strength condition, replicating Hirshman
(1995), and were more liberal in the believable condition, replicating Dube et al. (2010).
A stronger test of bias shifting, using relative response bias, did not result in the same
effects in memory, but did in reasoning. Additionally, I predicted an interaction of
cognitive ability and condition that did not emerge. Indeed, there is no evidence to
indicate cognitive ability played a role in response bias at all in memory. However, in
reasoning, higher cognitive ability participants were more conservative and shifted their
bias less than lower ability participants.
While both absolute and relative response bias measures were presented, they do
have different implications, as mentioned earlier. In the EVSD case, c is relative to the
midpoint between the distributions, which is also the optimal criterion that would
maximize accuracy. In the UVSD case, ca is relative to the midpoint between the
distributions, but that is not the same as optimal criterion because of the difference in
variances. Looking at response bias in comparison to optimal bias for individuals would
be particularly interesting. If optimal response bias is different in different conditions, it
is possible that participants responding optimally would shift their bias more than
participants not responding optimally. A closer examination of the extent to which
participants shift their bias and how cognitive ability may explain that is presented next in
Experiment 2.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENT 2
Given the consistent evidence in previous research and also in Experiment 1 that
cognitive ability appears to influence response bias, it was further studied in conjunction
with bias manipulations, since determining the appropriate response bias may differ
depending on the situation and the individual. Experiment 2 expanded on the study by
Aminoff and colleagues (2012) looking at individual differences and bias manipulations.
While several cognitive tasks were included in Aminoff and colleagues’ study, they
measured mostly verbal cognitive ability, rather than executive functioning aspects of
cognitive ability.
Experiment 2 focused on exploring how participants might choose to respond
optimally if there are competing definitions of optimality: maximizing accuracy, or
maximizing the expected value of the items. In other words, optimal criterion could be to
maximize correct responses and minimize errors when hits and correct rejections are
equally weighted (yielding a likelihood ratio of close to 1). But optimal criterion could be
to maximize correct responses and minimize errors when the benefits of hits and correct
rejections are not equally weighted (yielding a likelihood ratio less than 1 and more
liberal response bias if hits are particularly beneficial, and a likelihood ratio greater than
1 and more conservative response bias if correct rejections are particularly beneficial);
this would maximize the expected value. In particular, when the weights are externally
determined, say via a payoff manipulation in which different point values are given for
hits and correct rejections, an optimal criterion would be one that maximizes the number
of earned points. In such a condition, one cannot both maximize accuracy and points with

58

the same decision rule. When there is a tension between these optimal decision rules with
a payoff manipulation, participants will compromise and choose a decision rule between
the two (Bohil & Maddox, 2001; Maddox & Bohil, 2004). Understanding how individual
differences in cognitive ability interact with payoff manipulation was the main goal of
Experiment 2. Particularly, how do participants determine decision criteria when there is
competition in optimal decision rules, and are higher cognitive ability participants better
able to determine optimal decision criteria when instructed ahead of time which decision
rules to maximize?
Method
Participants
Experiment 2 was conducted entirely online for feasibility, given the sample size
needed for sufficient power. Again, participants were recruited through Amazon.com’s
Mechanical Turk and were restricted to ages 18-30, with the same requirements and
process to getting to the “bonus” study as in Experiment 1, except with the additional
requirement of not having participated in the first experiment. Also, participants were
told they could earn up to an additional 72 cents for their performance on the task in
addition to earning the $3 for completing the “bonus” study. This was to incentivize the
payoff manipulation. Of the 898 participants who completed a prescreening to determine
eligibility, 688 participants were eligible and 369 completed the full experiment.
Participants were excluded from analysis based on the same criteria as in
Experiment 1. There were 18 participants who reported an implausible SAT/ACT score
but were still able to access and complete the experiment. An additional 30 participants
performed poorly on the Go/No-Go task (lower than d’ of 0.5). As in Experiment 1, no
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participants were excluded based in their median reaction time in the Number-Letter task
(with cut-off of either less than 800 ms or greater than 2000 ms). There were 59
participants whose accuracy was not at least 10% greater for their highest confidence
responses than their lowest confidence responses. With these participants excluded, a
remaining 262 participants were included in the full analyses.
Because of the many manipulations that were included for the memory task and to
ensure a reasonable study duration, the instructions manipulation (Maximize Accuracy,
Maximize Payoff, and Maximize Both) was between-subjects. Specifically, in the final
sample presented below, 90 participants were in the Maximize Accuracy Instructions
condition, 88 were in the Maximize Payoff Instructions condition, and 84 were in the
Maximize Both Instructions condition. Further explanation of these conditions will
appear in the Memory task section.
Cognitive Ability Measures. As in Experiment 1, I measured cognitive ability with selfreported SAT or ACT, the Go/No-Go task, and the Number-Letter task. Because there
was some concern about measurement error of these tasks in Experiment 1, I also added
the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) with some modification. The Cognitive
Reflection Test is a three question measure of cognitive ability that Frederick used to
predict decision making. Because some participants may have encountered the task
previously (for example, in another online study on Mechanical Turk) and may have
memorized the answers, I changed some of the wording. For example, one original test
question reads, “If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it
take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?” In my version, I asked how long it would take
100 machines to make 50 widgets. If a participant did not know the correct answer to the
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original problem, they might respond 100 or 50 minutes; if a participant had memorized
the correct answer to the original problem and did not read carefully, they would respond
5 minutes. The correct answer here is 2.5 minutes.
Memory Task
Instead of including two tasks like in Experiment 1, only the memory task was
implemented in Experiment 2, given the complexity of the design and the difficulty in
having a sufficient number of reasoning problems. This memory task included three
study lists each of 40 words, each word presented three times. The test lists each included
40 targets and 40 lures.
In order to examine the relationship between optimal responding and bias
manipulations, I used a payoff manipulation including conservative, neutral, and liberal
payoffs. The payoff manipulation was implemented between lists and, like in some other
studies (e.g., Bohil & Maddox, 2001), consisted of only rewards for correct responses (no
penalties for incorrect). This was done in part to minimize confusion in the online sample
because they would not be able to receive further explanation beyond the written
instructions.
For the liberal payoff condition, participants saw Figure 10 on screen for the
duration of that list. This figure shows that hits would be rewarded more points than
correct rejections. In other words, they should try to be liberal in responding that an item
is old in order to earn the most number of points.

61

Figure 10. A liberal payoff manipulation. In this case, responding “old” correctly gives a
larger reward. Responding “new” correctly gives a smaller reward. If participants are
maximizing the reward, they should be biased to respond “old” to the item.
There was also a conservative payoff condition which rewarded correct rejections
more than hits and a neutral payoff condition in which participants earned the same
amount regardless of type of correct response. Order of the manipulation was
counterbalanced.
One third of the participants saw instructions about the payoff, and that accuracy
and the payoff are both important (Maximize Both), as is commonly done in payoff
manipulations. Because the base rates remained 50% old and 50% new items at test as in
Experiment 1, participants would not be able to choose a decision rule that would
maximize both accuracy and expected value, but they could choose to compromise (Bohil
& Maddox, 2001). In order to better understand how participants choose their criteria, the
other participants were instructed towards a decision rule. One third of the participants
saw instructions that asked them to Maximize Accuracy because the amount of extra
money they could earn would be based on their accuracy. The last third of the
participants saw instructions that asked them to Maximize Points because the amount of
extra money they could earn would be based on the number of points at the end. Instead
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of using cash in the payoff, points were converted to a cash equivalent proportional to the
possible 72 cent performance-based bonus.
By having different payoffs, participants attempting to find an optimal response
criterion need to weigh accuracy and payoff in order to do so and because they may
choose to sacrifice some accuracy for payoffs, may ultimately decide on a compromise
(Bohil & Maddox, 2001). By including different instructions emphasizing accuracy vs.
points/rewards, I examined how participants are influenced by this tension, by goals from
the instructions, and whether higher cognitive participants are better at choosing the
appropriate response bias.
Results
Variable Measurement, Approach to Analyses, and Hypotheses
There were two main dependent variables of interest: one, the individual’s
absolute response criterion location λ and two, how optimal the individual’s criterion
location was (the difference between the individual’s absolute response bias location λ
and the optimal response bias location). To define optimal response bias when the
benefits of hits and correct rejections are not the same (the conservative and liberal
payoffs here), the likelihood ratio formula (in Equation 3) was used. However, to provide
easier comparison to Experiment 1, the optimal likelihood ratios were converted to an
absolute location on the x-axis (i.e., transformed to the same scale as λ) and then
subtracted from the individual’s response criterion location λ. This means that
interpretations of the numbers are of criterion location on the x-axis (which were
presented in Experiment 1), rather than of likelihood ratios (which were not).
Approach to Analyses, and Hypotheses
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Participants were grouped into higher and lower cognitive using a median split
from a composite score of the component ability tasks (see Trippas, Handley, & Verde,
2013, 2014 for precedence for using a median split). A 2x3x3 mixed ANOVA (higher/
lower cognitive ability and payoff/accuracy/both instruction manipulations between
subjects, conservative/neutral/liberal payoff manipulations within subjects) was
conducted on the dependent variables of interest. I hypothesized that participants would
be influenced by the instructions: when told to Maximize Points, participants would
generally try to Maximize Points. I also hypothesized that higher cognitive ability
participants would be closer to optimal than lower cognitive ability participants. So when
the instructions were told to Maximize Points, higher cognitive ability participants would
set a criterion to optimize their points and when the instructions were to Maximize
Accuracy, higher cognitive ability participants would set a criterion to maximize their
accuracy. I also predicted that the tension between optimal according to the payoff and
optimal according to accuracy should be evident in the conservative and liberal
conditions (where the two conflict) and lead to suboptimal response bias, but not in the
neutral condition (where they coincide). I also hypothesized that this tension in
combination with different goals from the instructions would lead to participants trying to
resolve towards the goals from the instructions, but that it would be easier for higher
cognitive ability participants. That is, higher cognitive ability participants would have
closer to optimal response bias that maximizes their instructed goal when there is conflict
in how optimal could be defined. For example, I predicted that when told to Maximize
Points, higher cognitive ability participants would have a closer to optimal response bias
for points in the conservative and liberal payoffs. An interaction of cognitive ability and
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payoff manipulation would indicate that future experiments that use a payoff
manipulation should include cognitive ability, perhaps as a covariate, to account for what
has historically been considered acceptable noise.
The results from the three measures of cognitive ability are presented first. Next, I
present the ROCs and the results from the accuracy tests accounting for cognitive ability
to confirm that a median split sufficiently divided the two ability levels. Then, I present
the results from the response bias tests accounting for cognitive ability first with absolute
response bias location and then with the deviation from optimal response bias location.
Measures of Cognitive Ability
Performance in the four cognitive ability tasks, Go/No-Go accuracy, NumberLetter shifting cost, and SAT/ACT test score percentile, and proportion correct on the
CRT are shown in Figure 11. The histograms show performance on the tasks, and the
scatterplots show the relationships of the tasks with each other.
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Figure 11. Histograms of performance on the cognitive ability tasks and scatterplots of
their correlations in Experiment 2.
Visually comparing these scores (Figure 11) to those in the online sample from
Experiment 1 (Figure 4) reveals a high degree of similarity. Go/No-Go task performance
had a similar upper “limit”, and SAT/ACT performance included a left skewed
distribution though with non-negligible amounts of very low scores. The histogram for
Number-Letter task performance had a similar mode and though the tails were a little
longer in Experiment 2 with about 4 participants responding with much longer mean RT
than in Experiment 1.
The Cognitive Reflection Test, used only in Experiment 2, showed a right skew in
performance: most participants either missed all three items or only got one correct.
Including the CRT as a measure of cognitive ability for a composite-score based median
split changed less than 18% of participants’ status from higher to lower cognitive ability
or vice versa. It is possible that the inclusion of the CRT reduced the impact of any
misleading self-reported SAT/ACT scores as was the concern in Experiment 2, if only by
simply weighting each task less in the composite score-based median split.
As with Experiment 1, there were no significant correlations among the three
measures of cognitive ability. There were there no significant correlations with CRT as
well. In short, this sample was very similar to the online sample in Experiment 1, as
would be expected.
Measures of Response Bias and Response Bias Optimality
Absolute response criteria across different payoff conditions in Experiment 2
were highly correlated for participants in each instruction condition (seen in Figure 12).
The one exception was that participants in the Maximize Points instructions condition did
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not have significantly correlated response bias locations in the conservative and liberal
payoff conditions, r(86) = 0.16, p = 0.13. Shifts in bias are difficult to see in the
histograms here, but they are clearer in the ANOVA presented later and do indicate that
participants were appropriately influenced by the payoff conditions. These correlations
shown in Figure 12 did not account for cognitive ability as a potential predictor for
individual differences in response bias: those analyses are presented next.
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Figure 12. Scatterplot matrices of response bias in the memory and reasoning
tasks in Experiment 2.

Median Split, ROCs, and Accuracy Analyses
Median Split and ROCs
The ROCs for the memory task are shown in Figure 13 in order to provide an
overview of the data. There are three separate graphs for each of the instructions
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conditions, which were manipulated between subjects. Each graph includes the withinsubjects manipulation of payoff, where the darker the symbol, the more liberal the payoff.
Higher cognitive ability participants are shown in black in the ROC, with lower cognitive
ability participants in green for the Maximize Accuracy instructions, blue for the
Maximize Both instructions, and purple for the Maximize Points instructions. Again,
points with an x through them depict the criterion location that divides “old” responses
from “new” responses; these points were used for the response bias analyses presented
later.
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Figure 13. The ROC curves for the memory task in Experiment 2.

To visualize effects of ability on accuracy, compare the curve of the higher
cognitive ability participants (black points) to the lower cognitive ability participants
(colored points). According to the composite score split, higher cognitive ability
participants show greater discriminability than lower cognitive ability participants,
indicating that the median split was appropriate (e.g., Unsworth, 2010). To visualize the
effects of condition in Figure 13, compare the curve of the liberal payoff condition
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(darkest colored symbols) to the curve of the neutral payoff condition (lightly shaded
symbols) to the curve of the conservative payoff condition (open symbols). There should
be no difference in accuracy because the payoff should only shift response bias, i.e.,
where along the curve the points fall. It does appear that the conservative payoff led to
lower discriminability (open points are lower than the filled in points). But, more
reassuringly as a manipulation check, the curves are generally pushed farther to their
respective sides: the liberal curve (darkest symbols) is shifted to the right and the
conservative curve (lightest symbols) to the left.
Accuracy Analyses
Full Dataset Analysis
To statistically analyze these accuracy and response bias patterns, the ROCs for
each participant/condition were fit to the UVSD model. Unfortunately, like with
Experiment1’s reasoning task, there were many participants who did not use all of the
confidence levels which made individual fits very difficult. The proposed approaches to
compensate for this were to collapse across confidence levels or use a group-based slope.
While collapsing across confidence levels was not feasible in Experiment 1 (a maximum
of 7% of participants might potentially be fit in this way), it was feasible for Experiment
2 (up to 54% of participants potentially fit this way). So, for Experiment 2, individual fits
were used where possible (i.e., for participants who used at least 3 levels of confidence)
and group-based slope was used to fit the remaining participants.
Still, it is unclear why some participants failed to express many levels of
confidence in their responses. Furthermore, some participants may have even used only a
single response on every trial. There are two possible interpretations for why participants
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may have used a single response: they may have attempted to set an optimal criterion
location or they may have failed to follow the instructions. For the former interpretation,
using a single response for every trial, which reflects a very extreme criterion location,
would not be optimal in the neutral condition. This suggests, then, that participants who
used a single response may have failed to follow instructions and so their data do not
inform the hypotheses. Accordingly, a cleaner test of the hypothesis includes only the
participants who used multiple confidence ratings in every condition, allowing separate
ROCs to be fit.
I will report analyses of data for all participants who used multiple confidence
ratings in every condition using both a Full Dataset based on the combined including
group-based slope fits and individual fits (all 262 participants) and Subset from just the
participants’ individual fits (81 participants, with 45 higher cognitive ability and 36 lower
cognitive ability participants). The same median split was used in both the Full Dataset
and Subset analyses.
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Figure 14. Plot of accuracy, measured by da, by ability, instruction condition, and payoff
condition for all participants in Experiment 2.

To statistically analyze da (plotted in Figure 14), 2x3x3 mixed ANOVAs
(cognitive ability by instruction condition by payoff condition) were conducted as a
manipulation check to show that higher cognitive ability participants did have better
discriminability than lower cognitive ability participants, indicating an appropriate
median split. Figure 14 shows that higher cognitive ability participants (dotted lines)
were more accurate, measured with da, than the lower cognitive ability participants (solid
lines), F(1, 256) = 4.34, p = 0.003, η2G = 0.01. However, there was a significant main
effect of payoff condition (F(2, 512) = 10.02, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.01), unexpected because
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the payoff condition should only affect response bias, not discriminability. The
conservative payoff (far left points) led to lower accuracy than the neutral payoff (t(261)
=3.98, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.25) and the liberal payoff (t(261) = -3.68, p < 0.001,
Cohen’s d = 0.22).

Figure 15. Plot of accuracy, measured by da, by instruction condition and payoff
condition for all participants in Experiment 2.

There was also an unexpected significant interaction of instruction condition and
payoff condition, F(4, 512) = 2.69, p = 0.02, η2G = 0.008. This interaction, collapsed
across cognitive ability, is shown in Figure 15. It appears that accuracy decreased when
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instructions became more points-focused (purple lines) in the conservative payoff
condition (left points) but increased when instructions became more points-focused in the
liberal payoff condition (right points). While the instructions to consider points could
have potentially lead participants to focus on points to the detriment of accuracy, this
should not be specific to only the conservative condition. Indeed, this interaction was not
seen in the “cleaner” analysis with only participants who had individually fit slopes.
Subset Analysis: Only Participants with Individually Fit Slopes
The Full Dataset analyses were repeated on the subset of participants who had
individually fit slopes. Figure 16 shows only a significant main effect of payoff condition
(F(2, 150) = 4.31, p = 0.02, η2G = 0.02). The conservative payoff (far left points) led to
lower accuracy than the neutral payoff (t(80) = -2.49, p = 0.01, Cohen’s d = 0.28), and
the neutral payoff led to lower accuracy than the liberal payoff (t(80) = 2.02, p < 0.05,
Cohen’s d = 0.22). Unlike in the Full Dataset analysis, there was no main effect of
cognitive ability, and there was no significant interaction of payoff condition and
instruction condition.
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Figure 16. Plot of accuracy, measured by da, by ability, instruction condition, and payoff
condition for only participants with individually fit slopes in Experiment 2.
While only cognitive ability effects were expected and none appeared, this sample
is underpowered, with cell sizes as low as 11. Additionally, while there were no
particular hypotheses of instructions effects, effects of the payoff condition were not
expected. Indeed, the payoff manipulation is meant to only affect response bias. A check
of this hypothesis and the other response bias hypotheses follows.

Response Bias ANOVA Analyses
Absolute Response Bias Location
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Full Dataset Analysis
With indication that the median split was appropriate in the full dataset, I then
analyzed the effect of cognitive ability on response bias with a 2x3x3 mixed ANOVA
(cognitive ability by instructions condition by payoff condition). I hypothesized that
conservative payoffs should lead to more conservative absolute response bias λ (larger
values), and liberal payoffs should lead to more liberal absolute response bias λ (smaller
values). I also predicted that participants would follow instructions and shift their bias
more in the conservative/liberal conditions when instructed to Maximize Points.

Figure 17. Plot of absolute response bias location, measured by λ, by ability, instruction
condition, and payoff condition for all participants in Experiment 2.
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As seen in Figure 17, there was a significant effect of payoff condition, as
expected: liberal payoffs led to more liberal response bias and more conservative payoff
led to more conservative response bias (a general negative slope trend), F(2, 512) =
19.54, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.03. There was also an interaction of instruction condition and
payoff condition, F(4, 512) = 3.67, p = 0.006, η2G = 0.01, shown collapsed across ability
level in Figure 18. As can be clearly seen by the crossover of the purple and blue lines in
contrast to the green line, instructing participants to Maximize Points shifted their
response bias much more than instructing them to Maximize only Accuracy. In other
words, emphasizing the payoff led to greater effects of the payoff, as would be expected.

Figure 18. Plot of absolute response bias location, measured by λ, by instruction
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condition and payoff condition for all participants in Experiment 2.

Subset Analysis: Only Participants with Individually Fit Slopes
Analogous ANOVAs on the Subset data revealed there was the same significant
effect of payoff condition, where liberal payoffs led to more liberal response bias and
more conservative payoff led to more conservative response bias, F(2, 150) = 7.00, p =
0.001, η2G = 0.3. Unlike in the Full Dataset analysis, there was no interaction of
instruction condition and payoff condition.

Figure 19. Plot of absolute response bias location, measured by λ, by ability, instruction
condition, and payoff condition for only participants with individually fit slopes in
Experiment 2.
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Comparison to Optimal Response Bias Location
Full Dataset Analysis
The more relevant question for Experiment 2 was whether participants optimize
their decision criteria, and whether higher cognitive ability participants are better at
choosing optimal criterion locations than lower cognitive ability participants. Optimal
response bias can be defined in terms of maximizing the points or in terms of maximizing
accuracy; as mentioned earlier, these two goals lead to different optimal response bias
locations in this experiment because of the payoff manipulation. To see effects on
optimality of response bias, I conducted a 2x3x3 mixed ANOVA (cognitive ability by
instructions condition by payoff condition) on two dependent variables: difference from
optimal when maximizing points and difference from optimal when maximizing
accuracy, defined for each payoff condition/subject. Again, I predicted a main effect
payoff manipulation (conservative and liberal payoffs lead to less optimal response bias
because of tension between defining optimal). I also predicted a 2-way interaction of
instructions and payoff (e.g., instructions to Maximize Points leads to closer to optimal
bias for points, but Maximize Accuracy does not). And finally, I predicted a 3-way
interaction of cognitive ability, instructions, and payoff: higher cognitive ability
participants would be better at optimizing appropriate response bias based on instructions
when there is conflict in the optimal response bias (i.e., in the conservative and liberal
conditions).
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Figure 20. Plot of difference from optimal response bias location, defined in terms of
optimal payoff points, by ability, instruction condition, and payoff condition for all
participants in Experiment 2.
Figure 17 shows the difference from optimal for payoff: a positive number means
that the participant was more conservative than optimal, and a negative number means
that the participant was more liberal than optimal. As expected, there was a main effect of
instructions on the difference from optimizing for points, F(2, 256) = 10.89, p < 0.001,
η2G = 0.03: participants who were told to Maximize Accuracy (green lines) were less
optimal for points (farther away from the gray Optimal line) than participants who were
told to Maximize Points (purple lines), or to Maximize Both (blue lines). There was also
a main effect of payoff condition, F(2, 512) = 415.77, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.52: the neutral
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payoff condition led to very close to optimal response bias (middle points very near the
gray optimal line), but participants were not conservative enough in the conservative
payoff condition (left points more liberal than optimal) nor liberal enough in the liberal
payoff condition (right points more conservative than optimal). There was also an
interaction of instruction condition and payoff condition, F(4, 512) = 14.90, p < 0.001,
η2G = 0.07; participants in the accuracy condition were particularly non-optimal in the
liberal payoff condition (green lines in the rightmost category are higher than the others).
Contrary to my hypotheses, there were no effects or interactions with cognitive ability.
In looking at all participants in Experiment 2, there was no strong evidence that
higher cognitive ability participants were particularly more optimal for points in the nonneutral payoff conditions when instructed to Maximize Points. In other words, higher
cognitive ability participants did not maintain the goal of the instructions significantly
better than lower cognitive ability participants. Looking at how participants differed from
optimal response bias that maximized accuracy follows.
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Figure 21. Plot of difference from optimal response bias location, defined in terms of
optimal accuracy, by ability, instruction condition, and payoff condition for all
participants in Experiment 2.
Plotted in Figure 21 is how different participants’ criteria were from optimal
response bias for accuracy, where a positive number is more conservative than optimal
and negative is more liberal than optimal. One thing to note is that the scale for
optimizing for accuracy is very different from the scale for optimizing for points. The
likelihood ratio for optimizing for accuracy is around 1, but the likelihood ratio for
optimizing for points is 10 in the conservative payoff and 0.1 in the liberal payoff
conditions because of the particular points used here. This order of magnitude difference
is reflected in the degree to which participants may need to shift in order to maximize the
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points they can earn, hence the much larger scale in that figure.
In analyzing these data, as expected, there was a main effect of payoff condition,
F(2, 256) = 6.38, p = 0.002, η2G = 0.02: participants were more conservative in the
conservative payoff condition and more liberal in the liberal payoff condition (a general
negative slope trend in Figure 21). Indeed, this further shows that participants were
influenced as predicted by the payoff condition. There was also an interaction of
instruction condition and payoff condition, F(4, 512) = 3.60, p = 0.006, η2G = 0.02; as
would be expected, participants in the Maximize Points condition were particularly nonoptimal for accuracy in the conditions where they should be influenced by points (the left
and right ends of the purple lines are farther from optimal). Contrary to my hypotheses,
there were no effects or interactions with cognitive ability.
Subset Analysis: Only Participants with Individually Fit Slopes
The same analyses were repeated on the Subset of data. The only significant
effect was that of payoff condition, F(2, 150) = 203.44, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.63: the neutral
payoff condition led to very close to optimal response bias (middle points very near the
gray optimal line), but participants were not conservative enough in the conservative
payoff condition (left points more liberal than optimal) nor liberal enough in the liberal
payoff condition (right points more conservative than optimal).
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Figure 22. Plot of difference from optimal response bias location, defined in terms of
optimal payoff points, by ability, instruction condition, and payoff condition for only
participants with individually fit slopes in Experiment 2.
Figure 23 shows how different participants’ criteria were from optimal response
bias for accuracy, where a positive number is more conservative than optimal and
negative is more liberal than optimal. There were no significant effects; as can be seen in
the figure, the error bars are quite large.
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Figure 23. Plot of difference from optimal response bias location, defined in terms of
optimal accuracy, by ability, instruction condition, and payoff condition in Experiment 2.
So in analyzing only the participants with individually fit slopes, it appears that
both higher and lower cognitive ability participants were similar in optimizing for
accuracy, regardless of instructions.
Variability in Participants’ Difference from Optimal Criterion
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Figure 24. Plots of response bias difference from optimal as lines drawn between the
payoff conditions in Experiment 2. The top three are in comparison to optimizing payoff
points and the bottom three are in comparison to optimizing accuracy.
Figure 24 shows all participants’ difference from optimal response bias where the
closer to the horizontal 0 line, the more optimal. Lower cognitive ability participants are
represented with colored lines and higher cognitive ability participants are in dotted black
lines. It is clear that participants vary greatly in how close to optimal they are when
setting their decision criteria. Indeed, in the top row of the figure, there are a subset of
participants who clearly fail to approach optimal response bias based on the payoff in the
conservative and neutral conditions (their lines extend to -10 or 10). However, cognitive
ability as measured in the current study does not appear to predict this variability.
Experiment 2 Discussion
While the Full Dataset was analyzed, it consisted of a combination of model
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fitting approaches because almost half of the participants used too few confidence levels
to be individually fit. Accordingly, a Subset of participants whose data were able to be
individually fit was also analyzed. Examining effect on accuracy showed that higher
cognitive ability participants did perform better than lower cognitive ability participants
in the Full Dataset (though not in the underpowered Subset), but surprisingly, there was a
significant effect of payoff in both the Full Dataset and the Subset: the conservative
payoff led to lower discriminability even though payoff condition was meant only to
affect response bias.
Payoff condition had its expected effect on response bias: participants shifted
their absolute criterion location to be more conservative when in the conservative payoff
condition and to be more liberal in the liberal payoff condition, and indeed, instructing
participants to pay Maximize Points led to greater shifts than the other instructions.
However, there were no effects of cognitive ability on response bias location, nor
on optimizing response bias location. So, contrary to my hypotheses, there was no strong
evidence that higher cognitive ability participants are better able to choose optimal
response biases than lower cognitive ability participants.
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CHAPTER 4
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Conclusions from the Current Study
The overarching goal of the current study was to answer whether differences in
response bias in memory and reasoning can be explained by cognitive ability and how
these might affect bias manipulations in experimental design. Experiments 1 and 2
showed that in general, individual differences in response bias tendency in a recognition
memory task can not be explained by cognitive ability as measured in this study. There
was evidence in Experiment 1 to indicate that cognitive ability does play a role in a belief
bias reasoning task, however. Specifically, higher cognitive ability participants tended to
be more conservative in their response bias than lower cognitive ability participants in
reasoning. Experiment 2 directly examined the extent to which this increased shifting was
related to optimal responding. Contrary to predictions, higher cognitive ability
participants did not use more optimal response bias than lower cognitive ability
participants.
Limitations and Strengths
There are some limitations to the current study. First, the necessity of large
samples to test for potentially small effects required use of an online sample from
Mechanical Turk. While some researchers have argued that this population is equally
generalizable as the more typical undergraduate population (e.g., Paolacci, Chandler, &
Ipeirotis, 2010), there were some issues to note in the present study. For example,
because SAT or ACT test score was a measure of cognitive ability, online participants
were screened based on whether they could report a score within the plausible range of

92

scores and years given the age restriction. While participants could earn money for
completing the screening, there may have been particular motivation to access the rest of
the study; participants were sometimes caught misreporting their scores, but it was nearly
impossible to determine which scores were intentionally misleading and which were
misremembered. While the self-report aspect of test scores was also required in the lab
sample, participants may not have been as motivated to misreport their scores because
they were already eligible for participation by the time they came to the lab. Their test
scores may have also been more salient to them, having needed to report them for
entrance to the university, than the online sample who may have forgotten their precise
scores. Additionally, the poor performance in the Go/No-Go task in particular suggests
differences in motivation in the online sample. Also, the lack of control of environment in
the online sample in comparison to the lab sample is a general concern. It is unclear how
many participants had distractions in the online sample and it is almost certain that they
had a different range of distractions than in the lab sample. Still, the findings were
generally qualitatively similar across the online and lab sample in Experiment 1,
indicating that the differences in sample did not appear to affect this particular study.
Another issue was that in Experiment 2, participants may have chosen a strategy
that would undermine the goal of the experiment to measure response bias because of the
lack of penalties in the payoffs. In particular, by instructing some participants to
Maximize Points, but without penalizing incorrect answers, participants in, say, the
liberal payoff condition might adopt the strategy of only responding that items were old.
Because of how disparate the payoff was (1 point vs. 10 points), participants would have
to weigh 10 correct rejections vs. 1 hit in this liberal condition. That is, while earning 1

93

point for a correct rejection is better than earning 0 points for a false alarm if the item is a
lure, with an equal number of targets and lures, a participant might instead choose to
adopt the strategy of always saying that the item is a target because the resulting expected
value is higher. In this case, participants do indeed shift their bias towards a more liberal
one, but the task is no longer testing memory. An obvious solution would be to include
penalties for incorrect answers. This is usually how payoff manipulations are
implemented, though they were not implemented that way in the current study in order
for clarity and simplicity for the online participants.
Another limitation to the study came from the difficulty of fitting the signal
detection model to the behavioral data. Because a large proportion of participants did not
distribute their responses across all of the confidence levels, alternative approaches to
measuring accuracy and response bias were needed. In Experiment 1, the reasoning task
was estimated with the equal-variance signal detection model because there were too few
trials to fit the unequal-variance signal detection model. While recent research indicates
that this might be appropriate (Trippas et al., 2016), that research is as yet not peerreviewed nor published. The other approach, implemented in Experiment 2, used a
group-based slope for roughly 2/3 of the participants in at least one condition, but this
requires the assumption that such a slope is a good estimate for each individual’s true
slope. This assumption may not be appropriate, especially in a study of individual
differences. Easy remedies for future research include presenting more trials and
instructing participants to use all confidence levels, but the latter does pose other
potential complications. Specifically, instructing participants to use all confidence levels
would obscure participants’ natural response bias, though it could provide more validity
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in comparison to other studies that instruct their participants to do so.
Despite these limitations, this study still had many strengths. Experiment 1 was
the first to explore response bias in recognition memory and reasoning simultaneously.
While there are common processes in both recognition and reasoning (Heit et al., 2012),
they have often been studied independently. Experiment 2 also provided a thorough
examination of the tension between experiment demands (such as the payoff conditions)
and overarching goal maintenance (instructions to maximize accuracy or points) and how
cognitive ability might explain how that tension is resolved.
Future Directions
Though cognitive ability was not found to predict individual differences in
response bias in the current study, further research is still needed. For example, it is still
unclear what might predict how participants choose to compromise their response bias
when faced with conflicting optimal options. Some participants may be better at choosing
a compromise that optimizes both, or some may be better at maintaining goals throughout
the task. Further research could explore what might predict this. Additionally, the current
study used the Go/No-Go task, Number-Letter task, SAT/ACT test scores, and the
Cognitive Reflection Task to measure cognitive ability. A next step could be to determine
whether simpler, shorter, or more measurement error-resistant measures of cognitive
ability could predict response bias. Indeed, while the current tasks were used in part
because a working memory capacity task was not feasible for online implementation,
further simplicity of a task could increase the likelihood of use by other researchers in
accounting for the “extra noise” in response bias. That is, a simpler measure would be
more likely to be adopted as a potential covariate of response bias tendency or optimality
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in future research which would reduce the “noise” of individual differences in response
bias on parameter estimation or experimental manipulation.
Additionally, the current experiment examined signal detection-based measures of
response bias, particularly at the binary decision point (e.g., of deciding between old/new
in the memory task). Future research could examine how individual differences in
response bias might be reflected in the full ROC/full scale. For example, certain
participants may shift all of their criteria, or maybe only some of the criteria. Some
participants might exhibit a response bias towards using the extreme ends of the scale
rather than distributing their responses across the full scale, as has been found in
marketing and survey contexts (e.g., Chami-Castaldi, Reynolds, & Wallace, 2008;
Greenleaf, 1992; Johnson, 2003; Naemi et al., 2009). Indeed, while sometimes treated as
a continuous scale, confidence scales are Likert scales and so other research on Likert
scales may be applicable in examining response bias here; other response bias styles than
extreme response bias may also be relevant (e.g., Baumgartner & Steenkamp, 2001; R.
Jones & Rorer, 1973).
Furthermore, response bias is sometimes measured not on a global scale (across
the whole list) but on a local scale (e.g. Benjamin, Diaz, & Wee, 2009; Jones et al., 2015;
Treisman & Faulkner, 1984; Treisman & Williams, 1984). That is, sequential
dependencies, or what happened on previous trials such as a string of targets in a row,
may affect the short-term adjustments participants make during a test list. It could be
important to know what predicts the extent to which participants are influenced by
sequential dependencies and adjust their criteria accordingly.
Relatedly, metacognition and its role in response bias could be predicted by
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cognitive ability. Indeed, a study on metacognition found that the use of confidence
ratings scales was stable across lists (Thompson & Mason, 1996). Additionally, the
metacognitive processes of long-term and short-term adjustments to response criteria
could reflect the ability to maintain and/or update these goals. Other potentially relevant
metacognitive processes include processing one’s own uncertainty (de Gardelle &
Mamassian, 2014), or how that processing could lead to better metacognitive sensitivity,
i.e., greater confidence in a response maps onto better discriminability (Maniscalco &
Lau, 2012). More recent work by Jonker (2016) indicates that metacognition of
confidence in a source memory task can predict response bias in recognition and recall.
An interesting question could therefore be: what metacognitive processes separate from
other cognitive ability processes influence response bias?
General Conclusions
That there are individual differences in response bias can be seen quite clearly by
the variability in response bias location and response bias shifting. Yet, as measured in
the current study, it does not appear that cognitive ability predicts response bias in
memory. In reasoning, though, higher cognitive ability participants tend to be more
conservative in responding. Further exploration of what predicts the variability in
response bias is important because it could be used to reduce the error variance in
statistical analyses, and therefore provide more power to the experimental design and
analyses. Indeed, when those designs include bias manipulations, such as payoffs, the
impact on response bias may not be entirely monolithic: some participants in some payoff
conditions respond quite differently. As seen here, bias manipulations are generally
effective, but they may also introduce unaccounted for noise when one ignores the
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interaction of individual differences on such manipulations. Thus, while the current study
focused on cognitive ability as a predictor, understanding individual differences in
response bias in memory and reasoning more generally ultimately enriches the
understanding and theories of cognition.
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